Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, LP v. Pa. G.C.Bd.
175 EM 2014
| Pa. | Mar 29, 2016Background
- SugarHouse HSP Gaming, LP and Market East Associates, LP sought to challenge the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board’s grant of a Category 2 slot license to Stadium Casino, LLC in Philadelphia.
- The Board allowed Market East to intervene fully on certain statutory issues (sections 1304 and 1330 of the Gaming Act) but denied SugarHouse full intervention as to those issues, permitting SugarHouse limited participation.
- SugarHouse appealed the Board’s licensing decision and sought to press the same statutory arguments on appeal that it had been partially denied below.
- The Court found Market East had presented duplicative arguments on the contested statutory issues, and the Office of Enforcement Counsel declined to take a legal position on section 1330, leaving advocacy to intervenors.
- The opinion addresses (1) whether partial denial of intervention precludes appellate review of the denied issues and (2) whether SugarHouse’s interests were adequately represented such that further intervention was unnecessary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a party denied full intervention on some issues may press those issues on appeal | SugarHouse: Denial of intervention as to specific issues should not preclude it from raising those issues on appeal | Board: Intervention limited below means appellant lacks standing to pursue those issues on appeal | Court: Did not broadly bar such appeals but found on facts SugarHouse had no injury because Market East presented duplicative arguments; thus SugarHouse’s partial-denial claim was moot here |
| Whether denial of full intervention was reversible where another intervenor presented the same arguments | SugarHouse: Partial denial harmed its ability to advocate distinct interests (market concentration) | Board/majority: Market East adequately represented the contested statutory issues | Held: No reversible error — Market East’s advocacy made SugarHouse’s partial denial inconsequential as to sections 1304 and 1330 |
| Whether the collateral order doctrine makes orders limiting (but not wholly denying) intervention immediately appealable | SugarHouse: Immediate review may be required to protect due process where participation is limited | Board: Collateral-order immediate appeal is reserved for complete denials; limited intervention is not immediately appealable | Held: Court observed Pennsylvania law permits collateral-order appeals for complete denials but not established for partial denials; federal precedent generally treats limited-intervention orders as non-appealable until final judgment |
| Whether the Board’s regulations create confusion about who may appeal (party vs participant/intervener) | SugarHouse: Regulations’ definitions blur appeal rights and can prejudice limited intervenors | Board: Regulatory scheme governs and was applied here | Held: Court noted genuine regulatory confusion (party vs participant/intervener) and recommended caution, but resolved case on adequacy-of-representation grounds rather than creating a broad rule about appealability |
Key Cases Cited
- Nemirovsky v. Nemirovsky, 776 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. 2001) (discussing finality and appealability of orders denying intervention)
- Larock v. Sugarloaf Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 740 A.2d 308 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999) (same)
- Eng v. Coughlin, 865 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1989) (limited intervention not immediately appealable; may await final judgment)
- Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370 (U.S. 1987) (refusing immediate appeal of order allowing limited intervention)
- Society Hill Civic Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Gaming Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175 (Pa. 2007) (holding persons who fail entirely to intervene lack standing to appeal Board decisions)
- Appeal of Municipality of Penn Hills, 546 A.2d 50 (Pa. 1988) (recognizing administrative tribunals may limit intervention and that scope of intervention can affect appellate rights)
- Rhode Island v. U.S. EPA, 378 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing potential costs of postponing review and duplication when intervention denied)
- Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 687 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1982) (denying immediate appeal of limited-intervention order)
- Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1979) (limited intervention does not justify interlocutory appeal)
- Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Peninsula Shipbuilders’ Ass’n, 646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981) (declining remand where intervenor erroneously denied and final judgment could provide review)
- Wheeler v. American Home Prods. Corp., 582 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977) (issues denied below may be raised on appeal from final judgment)