578 F.Supp.3d 511
S.D.N.Y.2022Background
- Plaintiff SUEZ Water New York, a New York public-water system operator, sued DuPont-related defendants (Old DuPont, Chemours, New DuPont, Corteva) alleging PFAS (notably PFOA/PFOS) contamination of its source waters and costs to monitor/treat to meet NY MCLs.
- SUEZ alleges Old DuPont and Chemours ("Manufacturing Defendants") manufactured, sold, licensed and distributed PFAS into the New York market for decades, including sales to industrial customers and licensees whose use/disposal allegedly released PFAS into New York waterways, POTWs, landfills and groundwater.
- Chemours was spun out from Old DuPont in 2015; New DuPont (formerly DowDuPont) and Corteva arose from later restructurings. SUEZ alleges successor assumption of Old DuPont liabilities by Chemours and (on information/belief) by New DuPont and Corteva.
- Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(2) (personal jurisdiction) and Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). The Court addressed jurisdiction first and then merits as to those defendants over whom it had jurisdiction.
- Court held: personal jurisdiction exists over Old DuPont and Chemours (specific jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR §302(a)(1) and due process) but not over New DuPont and Corteva (no successor-jurisdiction imputation). The Court dismissed all substantive claims against Old DuPont and Chemours for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Personal jurisdiction over Old DuPont & Chemours | Defendants sold/licensed PFAS continuously into NY to industrial buyers/licensees and thus transacted business in NY and could foresee litigation here | Contacts are too generalized/attenuated; no specific NY transactions or customers pled; foreseeability alone insufficient | Court: prima facie showing met — repeated direct sales/licensing into NY sufficed under CPLR §302(a)(1) and due process (minimum contacts). |
| Personal jurisdiction over New DuPont & Corteva (successor theory) | Jurisdictional contacts of Old DuPont imputed because New DuPont/Corteva assumed Old DuPont PFAS liabilities via restructuring agreements | Successor jurisdiction requires merger/continuity of ownership (or equivalent); mere assumption of liabilities (or asset transfers) does not confer predecessor's jurisdictional contacts | Court: successor-jurisdiction theory rejected (no continuity/merger); New DuPont and Corteva dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
| Causation (sufficient pleading that defendants were a substantial factor) | Alleged long-term, continuous supply and licensing of PFAS into NY, and foreseeable release/disposal, suffice at pleading stage to connect defendants to SUEZ's contamination | Allegations are speculative/attenuated: no specific products, quantities, customers, locations, market share or proximate releases tied to SUEZ wells; plaintiffs must plead more than but-for causation | Court: allegations implausible as to causation — too attenuated/speculative to show defendants were a substantial factor in contamination; failure to plead reasonably probable source. |
| Viability of tort claims (nuisance, negligence, trespass, strict liability) | Defendants created/foreseeably contributed to contamination; duties and participation/support for nuisance/negligence/strict liability exist | Defendants argue lack of control/participation over downstream users' disposal, absence of duty to third parties, failure to plead immediate/inevitable consequence for trespass, and absence of defect/alternative design for strict liability theories | Court: all tort claims dismissed on merits. Nuisance and negligence fail for insufficient causation and lack of requisite control/duty; trespass fails (not immediate/inevitable consequence); strict liability/abnormally dangerous, design-defect, and failure-to-warn claims dismissed for lack of pleaded elements (feasible alternative design, proximate causation from warning failure). Dismissal without prejudice; leave to amend. |
Key Cases Cited
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff bears burden on Rule 12(b)(2) motion; prima facie showing standard)
- Dorchester Fin. Secs., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.) (prima facie jurisdictional showing varies by procedural posture; pleading on information and belief permissible pre-discovery)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Ops., S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (U.S.) (limits on general jurisdiction; "essentially at home")
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (U.S.) (same: general jurisdiction constraints)
- Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (U.S.) (specific-jurisdiction focus on defendant's contacts with the forum, not plaintiff's contacts)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (U.S.) (product distributed into forum that causes injury can support specific jurisdiction)
- Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327 (N.Y.) (CPLR §302(a)(1) "arises from" standard: permissive nexus)
- In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.) (groundwater contamination causation, nuisance, and trespass analyses)