Succession of Crute v. Crute, 226 So. 3d 1161

Frank and Clara Crate executed an Act of Partition and Settlement of Community Property on May 6, 1994 that (1) allocated certain assets to each, and (2) in Section 3 declared additional property to remain in indivision with a survivorship clause giving the survivor sole ownership.
The Partition Agreement was made part of a divorce judgment approved by the trial court on October 6, 1994.
Frank Crate died in 2005; his daughter Lydia Teixeira (succession administratrix) filed suit to set aside the Partition Agreement’s survivorship/indivision provisions as contrary to law.
Clara Crate moved for summary judgment in both the succession and divorce/declaratory suits; the trial court granted summary judgment in Clara’s favor and ordered Teixeira to deliver the Section 3 property to Clara.
On appeal the court considered jurisdictional and consolidation challenges, and whether Section 3 of the Partition Agreement was valid under Louisiana law existing in 1994 (not later amendments).
The appeals court held Section 3 unlawful as an indefinite agreement to hold property in indivision beyond the 15-year limit in La. C.C. art. 807 (precluding partition for more than 15 years), declared that portion absolutely null, reversed the amended judgment, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Subject-matter jurisdiction / consolidation	Teixeira: Division A (non-family) lacked jurisdiction after creation of family divisions; transfer/consolidation improper.	Crute: Parties agreed to transfer/consolidate; district court divisions retained jurisdiction.	Court held jurisdiction existed and consolidation by agreement was not an abuse of discretion.
Validity of survivorship/indivision clause in Section 3	Teixeira: Clause unlawfully required indefinite indivision, violated co-ownership and testamentary rules; judgment based on it is null.	Crute: Survivorship clause is a valid contractual arrangement; not a will, enforceable.	Court held Section 3 violated Article 807 (indefinite exclusion of partition), was a violation of public order, and thus absolutely null.
Preclusive effect / res judicata of 1994 judgment	Crute: 1994 judgment final; more than 20 years passed; res judicata and prescription bar challenge.	Teixeira: Judgment is null and thus subject to collateral attack at any time.	Court held an absolute nullity is not res judicata, may be attacked anytime; exception denied.
Law-of-the-case (prior grant of summary judgment in succession suit)	Crute: Earlier summary judgment finding the Partition Agreement valid controls.	Teixeira: Earlier ruling was erroneous; law-of-the-case should not prevent reconsideration.	Court found palpable error in prior ruling and declined to apply law-of-the-case; reviewed and rejected Section 3.

Welborn v. 19th Judicial District Court, 974 So.2d 1 (La. 2008) (legislature may divest district court jurisdiction by granting exclusive jurisdiction to family court)
Becker & Assocs., Inc. v. Lou-Ark Equipment Rentals Co., 331 So.2d 474 (La. 1976) (perpetual options or restraints that take property out of commerce are null)
Walker v. Chapital, 50 So.2d 641 (La. 1951) (agreement to postpone partition must be definite and certain)
Giardina v. Giardina, 158 So. 615 (La. 1935) (indefinite postponement of partition is unenforceable)