Styven Alexis Herrera v. U.S. Attorney General
811 F.3d 1298
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Herrera, a Peruvian native and lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Georgia in 2001 of burglary and sentenced to five years of probation with a special condition of one year of house arrest; the court reserved the right to incarcerate if probation were revoked.
- DHS charged Herrera as removable in 2014, alleging his burglary conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it carried a "term of imprisonment [of] at least one year."
- Herrera obtained a Georgia clarification stating his sentence was "entirely on straight probation" and that the court did not impose "any confinement whatsoever." He argued this meant no term of imprisonment existed for immigration purposes.
- The immigration judge and the BIA rejected Herrera’s challenge, concluding the one year of house arrest counted as "confinement" and therefore a term of imprisonment of at least one year, making the burglary an aggravated felony and rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and whether the BIA’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether one year of court-ordered house arrest constitutes a "term of imprisonment [of] at least one year" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) and thus makes a burglary conviction an aggravated felony | Herrera: house arrest is not "confinement"; Georgia clarification shows no confinement or imprisonment | Government/BIA: "term of imprisonment" includes periods of "confinement" beyond incarceration; house arrest is a serious restriction and counts as confinement; state clarification does not control federal meaning | The court held house arrest is a form of "confinement" and thus a "term of imprisonment" of at least one year; Herrera's conviction is an aggravated felony and petition denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Dixon v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 768 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir.) (standard of review for aggravated-felony questions)
- Poveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.) (BIA interpretations of ambiguous immigration statutes entitled to deference)
- INS v. Aguirre–Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (judicial deference to Executive in immigration context)
- United States v. Ayala-Gomez, 255 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir.) (term of imprisonment includes periods excused by sentencing court regardless of label)
- Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (disjunctive statutory terms normally have separate meanings)
- Ilchuk v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 434 F.3d 618 (3d Cir.) (house arrest can constitute confinement for immigration purposes)
- United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir.) (state clarification of sentence not controlling over federal interpretation)
- Rodriguez v. Lamer, 60 F.3d 745 (11th Cir.) (house arrest can serve punitive or rehabilitative functions and is treated like incarceration in some federal contexts)