2019 Ohio 3937
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- In October 2014 Daryl Stykes was injured when his motorcycle struck a vehicle entering at a T-intersection (Bevis Ln. and Hollis Dr.) where the stop sign on the minor approach was missing.
- Stykes sued Colerain Township (Oct. 2017) alleging negligent failure to maintain the stop sign under the public-roads exception to political-subdivision immunity, R.C. 2744.02(B)(3).
- Township moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), asserting statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; the trial court granted the motion (Apr. 2018).
- On appeal Stykes argued the stop sign was a traffic-control device mandatory under the OMUTCD or state statute (R.C. 4511.65) and thus fell within the public-roads exception.
- The court analyzed whether the stop sign was "mandated by the Ohio Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices" (OMUTCD) or by statute, and whether Bibler v. Stevenson controlled.
- The court concluded the OMUTCD treats stop-sign placement as discretionary ("should"), R.C. 4511.65(D) did not mandate a sign at this non-through-highway intersection, and no statutory exception to immunity applied; dismissal was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2744.02(B)(3) public‑roads exception applies because the stop sign is a traffic‑control device "mandated by the OMUTCD" or statute | Stykes: the township’s failure to maintain a mandated stop sign brings the claim within the public‑roads exception | Township: stop‑sign placement here was discretionary under the OMUTCD and not statutorily mandated, so immunity applies | Held: No. OMUTCD treats stop signs as discretionary; not a mandated traffic device, so exception does not apply |
| Whether R.C. 4511.65 (including subsection D) or Bibler requires a stop sign at this intersection | Stykes: R.C.4511.65(D) or Bibler principles make placement/maintenance mandatory once an intersection is designated | Township: R.C.4511.65 mandates relate to through highways only; this was a T‑intersection of township streets, not a through highway | Held: R.C.4511.65(A)/Bibler apply only where statute mandates signs at through highways; 4511.65(D) does not make signs mandatory here |
| Whether the complaint survived a Civ.R.12(B)(6) dismissal | Stykes: allegations suffice to state a claim under the public‑roads exception | Township: even accepting allegations, no set of facts would show a mandated device, so dismissal proper | Held: Dismissal affirmed; complaint fails to state a claim because no applicable exception to immunity was pled |
Key Cases Cited
- Bibler v. Stevenson, 80 N.E.3d 424 (Ohio 2016) (plurality: where Revised Code mandates signs at through highways, OMUTCD discretion is displaced and the public‑roads exception may apply)
- Howard v. Miami Twp. Fire Div., 891 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio 2008) (framework for political‑subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744)
- Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 814 N.E.2d 44 (Ohio 2004) (de novo review of dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6))
- State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 605 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio 1992) (Civ.R. 12(B)(6) tests sufficiency of complaint)
- Deitz v. Harshbarger, 89 N.E.3d 1271 (3d Dist. 2017) (distinguishing Bibler where roads at issue were not through highways)
- State v. Preztak, 907 N.E.2d 1254 (8th Dist. 2009) (plurality opinions are persuasive, not binding)