Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 469

Plaintiffs seek just compensation under the Takings Clause for land in the Prado Dam Flood Control Basin withheld from development due to flood-control plans and related easements.
The Prado Dam project, completed in 2008 for phase one, would raise the flood inundation line by ten feet to 566 feet above sea level.
The government and Orange County entities were to acquire lands and flowage easements for the project; the Orange County entities acted as non-agent purchasers/condemners.
Cities and agencies altered zoning and development plans in response to flood maps, affecting property values and eligibility for federal flood insurance.
Plaintiffs allege the government has inversely condemned a permanent flowage easement or, alternatively, that records of survey and monuments occupy their land and/or cloud their title.
Discovery had not begun, and this is the plaintiffs’ first motion to amend after the court had dismissed the complaint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether reconsideration is warranted to address a taking of land occupied by survey monuments	Plaintiffs argue monuments show a permanent taking of land	Monuments do not establish a physical taking of the land	Limited reconsideration warranted for taking of land occupied by monuments
Whether new evidence supports a physical taking via flood easement	New records show a future flood easement constituting a taking	Evidence shows only apprehension of future flooding, not a taking	No physical taking under flood easement; evidence insufficient to amend claim for flowage easement
Whether a hybrid/de facto/constructive taking theory or cloud on title is timely or futile	Cites Drakes Bay-type hybrid/constructive taking and cloud on title theories	Such theories are not timely or supported by facts here	Amendment to hybrid/constructive theories generally futile; limited to monuments taking viability
Whether severability of phase one affects takings viability	Phase one severable from phases two and three, impacting takings	Phase completion is irrelevant to taking viability	Reconsideration not granted based on severability; still no physical taking of flowage easement
Whether fairness/justice claim can be pursued	Seek a broad fairness-based relief without traditional takings analysis	Courts do not recognize such generalized relief; need established takings theory	Fairness/justice claim rejected as a stand-alone basis for relief; not permissible

Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932) (apprehension of flooding not a taking; Hurley discussed remedy dynamics)
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939) (actual flooding required for a physical taking; apprehension insufficient)
United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939) (apprehension of future flooding not a taking)
Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 91 Ct.Cl. 264 (1940) (no taking by partial flood-control construction or land entry for surveys)
Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (1970) (hybrid takings theory; complex precondemnation conduct; not controlling here)
Mesa Ranch Partnership v. United States, 650 F.2d 285 (1980) (maps or actions showing potential takings; not a taking by themselves)
Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (1977) (de facto/constructive takings framework in urban renewal context)
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (Takings clause purpose to prevent unfair burdens; used to frame analysis)
Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984) (aside on condemning notices not constituting a taking)