Strulson v. Chegg, Inc.
3:15-cv-00828
W.D. Ky.Dec 4, 2017Background
- Strulson was hired by Chegg in 2008, became warehouse manager, and in 2013 was diagnosed with lung cancer; she underwent surgery and four rounds of chemotherapy with frequent doctor visits and limitations (couldn’t walk the warehouse, used a golf cart).
- While on and after FMLA leave, Strulson stayed in contact with HR and supervisors and inquired about remaining FMLA time; she was cleared to return to work with limitations in January 2014.
- In April 2014, after informing her boss of a possible recurrence, Chegg terminated Strulson, citing alleged ethics violations (hiring her husband’s company) and improper hiring of a temporary worker with felony convictions; Strulson alleges those reasons were pretextual and termination was motivated by her illness and related costs.
- Strulson filed claims under the Kentucky Equal Opportunities Act (KEOA), FMLA (interference and retaliatory discharge), ERISA § 510 interference, and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act; four claims were previously dismissed on a 12(b)(6) ruling.
- Strulson moved for reconsideration; the court, applying Rule 54(b) interlocutory-reconsideration standards, granted reconsideration and reinstated the KEOA, both FMLA claims, and the ERISA interference claim, vacating pending summary judgment motions and the case schedule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| KEOA disability — whether lung cancer is a "substantial physical disability" | Strulson alleges facts showing substantial impairment (post-surgery inability to stand/walk/drive, bedbound from chemo, used golf cart at work) | Chegg says impairments were temporary and she worked for months before termination | Reinstated: complaint alleges sufficient facts to plausibly show a substantial physical disability under KEOA |
| FMLA interference — serious health condition & covered employer status | Strulson alleges surgery, continuing treatment (weekly appointments, 4 chemo sessions), and FMLA leave usage and employer communications | Chegg contended complaint lacked facts showing a serious health condition and that it was a covered employer | Reinstated: facts plausibly allege serious health condition and permit inference Chegg is a covered employer at the 12(b)(6) stage |
| FMLA retaliatory discharge — termination in retaliation for FMLA use | Strulson alleges temporal proximity and notices about FMLA availability and employer knowledge of leave | Chegg relied on asserted non-retaliatory reasons for firing (ethics violations, hiring decisions) | Reinstated: tied to interference holding; sufficient allegations to proceed past dismissal |
| ERISA § 510 interference — whether termination was motivated by employee benefit concerns | Strulson alleges she was a plan participant, incurred substantial medical costs, Chegg shared health plan costs, and termination closely followed illness with statements about cost | Chegg argues stated grounds for termination were legitimate and pretext not shown | Reinstated: complaint alleges facts addressing elements of ERISA interference and motive sufficient to survive 12(b)(6) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for pleading)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions not entitled to assume truth for pleading)
- Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t v. Hotels.com, L.P., 590 F.3d 381 (standards for reconsidering interlocutory orders)
- Bryson v. Regis. Corp., 498 F.3d 561 (describing FMLA interference/entitlement theory)
- Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037 (elements and burden-shifting for ERISA § 510 interference claims)
- Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., [citation="118 F. App'x 942"] (district court authority to reconsider interlocutory orders)