Strong v. State, 309 Ga. 295

Background

On August 25, 2015 Aaron Strong stabbed and killed Maurice Arnold and stabbed Maurice’s son Deandre; Strong claimed self-defense. He was tried on malice murder, felony murder (based on aggravated assault), aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and two knife-possession counts. The jury acquitted on malice murder and aggravated battery but convicted on felony murder, aggravated assault (Deandre), and both knife counts; Strong received life without parole plus additional terms.
The State introduced extensive other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(b): roughly nine prior violent incidents over decades (assaults/threats against former partners, an alleged 1994 shooting, a 2001 assault leaving a woman paralyzed, a 2012 beating of an employee). Most alleged incidents had no convictions, and some witnesses recanted or denied parts of reports.
The trial court admitted the other-acts evidence for intent, motive, and to negate mistake/accident and justification, and gave a limiting instruction that the jury should consider the evidence only for those purposes.
On appeal Strong argued the 404(b) admissions were an abuse of discretion and unduly prejudicial; the State (and Attorney General) countered that the evidence was relevant and alternatively admissible as victim/character evidence under Rule 404(a).
The Georgia Supreme Court held the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the voluminous other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b), rejected the Attorney General’s Rule 404(a) alternative, found the errors not harmless given the severity and volume of the extrinsic acts and lack of convictions, and reversed Strong’s convictions (while noting the State may retry).

Issues

Issue	State’s Argument	Strong’s Argument	Held
1) Was admission of multiple prior violent acts proper under OCGA § 24-4-404(b)?	Evidence was relevant to intent, motive, and to rebut justification/self-defense.	The other-acts evidence was remote, dissimilar, and highly prejudicial; it primarily showed propensity, not a proper 404(b) purpose.	Admission was an abuse of discretion — 404(b) purposes not satisfied given low probative value and high unfair prejudice.
2) Could the other-acts evidence be treated as permissible character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404(a)?	Attorney General: yes — once defendant introduced evidence of victim’s violent character, State could rebut with defendant’s violent character.	Strong: trial court limited use to 404(b) and 404(a) rebuttal (if any) could not justify the admitted specific-act testimony; Rule 405 limits character proof to reputation/opinion.	Rejection of State’s 404(a) salvage theory — most specific-act testimony exceeded Rule 405 and was not admissible as rebuttal character evidence.
3) Was admission of the other acts harmless error?	(District Attorney conceded evidence refuting self-defense was not overwhelming.)	The other-acts evidence was highly prejudicial and likely influenced the jury; prejudice not harmless.	Not harmless: cumulative, severe, remote other acts (including alleged shooting and paralysis) and lack of convictions made prejudice highly probable; reversal required.
4) Did the record otherwise support convictions (sufficiency/double jeopardy)?	Evidence was sufficient for felony murder; no double jeopardy problem despite acquittal on malice murder.	Strong argued double jeopardy (briefly).	Evidence constitutionally sufficient to support convictions; double jeopardy argument rejected; but convictions reversed for prejudicial evidentiary error.

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional sufficiency standard for conviction)
Beechum v. United States, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.) (risk jury will punish for uncharged, unprosecuted acts; caution on extrinsic-act admission)
Kirby v. State, 304 Ga. 472 (Rule 404(b) three-part test and abuse-of-discretion review)
Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 158 (limited probative need for intent where defendant asserts self-defense; other-acts prejudice analysis)
Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69 (consideration of similarity, remoteness, and prejudicial effect when admitting 404(b) evidence)
Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65 (relevance is binary under Rule 401)
Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533 (404(b) and when evidence to disprove mistake/accident is unnecessary if not in issue)
United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938 (8th Cir.) (danger of mini-trials and jury distraction from central issues when government offers extensive extrinsic-act evidence)