Stringer v. Town of Jonesboro
20-30192
5th Cir.Jan 19, 2021Background
- Since at least November 2011, sewage from the Town of Jonesboro’s malfunctioning Cemetery Lift Station repeatedly discharged onto Renee Stringer’s property and into her home, causing persistent odors, contamination, and property invasion.
- Stringer repeatedly complained to the Town and Mayor James Bradford; she alleges some actions were retaliatory after she ran against Bradford for mayor.
- Louisiana regulators (LDEQ and LDOH) knew of the discharges: LDEQ issued warning letters and compliance orders; LDOH enforced the state Sanitary Code, imposed fines, mandated remedial measures, and obtained a state-court enforcement order.
- Stringer gave CWA notice on December 17, 2018, and sued in federal court on March 18, 2019 (initially only a CWA citizen suit; later amended to add § 1983 takings and First Amendment retaliation claims).
- The district court dismissed all claims, holding LDOH’s enforcement of the Sanitary Code triggered the CWA’s § 1319(g) diligent-prosecution bar and that Stringer’s § 1983 claims were time-barred under Louisiana’s one-year prescriptive period.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims as untimely but reversed dismissal of the CWA claim, holding the Sanitary Code is not "comparable" to the CWA because it lacks meaningful citizen-participation mechanisms; the court declined to resolve late-raised arguments about LDEQ enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LDOH enforcement of the Louisiana Sanitary Code bars a CWA citizen suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) | Stringer: Sanitary Code enforcement does not preclude her citizen suit because state action is not comparable to the CWA | Defendants: LDOH’s enforcement is comparable and thus triggers the § 1319(g) diligent-prosecution bar | Reversed: Sanitary Code is not comparable because it lacks structured citizen notice/participation required by Lockett; § 1319(g) bar does not apply |
| Whether LDEQ’s enforcement of state environmental law (LEQA) bars the CWA suit | Stringer: LDEQ enforcement was not argued below and the record is incomplete; court should not consider it | Defendants: LDEQ’s LEQA enforcement is comparable and, if diligent, would bar the suit | Not reached: Issue raised too late and record insufficient; court declines to decide on appeal |
| Whether Stringer’s § 1983 takings claim is time-barred | Stringer: Limitations tolled or a longer prescription applies; accrual delayed by Town’s promises to fix | Defendants: Claim accrued when sewage invasions occurred (2011); Louisiana one-year period bars claim | Affirmed: § 1983 takings claim accrued when she knew of the invasions (2011); one-year Louisiana period expired well before suit |
| Whether Stringer’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim is time-barred | Stringer: Individual retaliatory acts should be treated as discrete accrual events, some within one year of suit | Defendants: Retaliation began by 2015; no retaliatory act alleged within one year before suit | Affirmed: Complaint shows last alleged retaliation by March 2018 or earlier; no pleaded act within the one-year window, so claim is untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality discussion of "waters of the United States")
- Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (citizen suits supplement, not supplant, government enforcement)
- Lockett v. EPA, 319 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2003) (framework for when a state law is "comparable" under § 1319(g))
- Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (factors for comparability of state statutes)
- N. & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991) (public participation considerations in comparability analysis)
- McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring rough comparability across classes of CWA provisions)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (paradigmatic takings: physical invasion/appropriation)
- Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) (takings claim accrues when property has been taken)
- Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989) (§ 1983 statutes of limitations borrow state personal-injury periods)
- Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (accrual rule: limitations run when plaintiff knows facts supporting injury)
