105 F. Supp. 3d 1323
S.D. Ala.2015Background
- Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and to have those laws recognized in Alabama; the case adds named plaintiffs and a plaintiff class.
- Court previously issued preliminary injunctions against enforcement of Alabama’s same-sex marriage prohibitions; the first injunction against Attorney General Strange was stayed then went into effect in 2015.
- Plaintiffs allege they are adults in committed same-sex relationships and face uncertainty about family recognition and emergency decisions due to Alabama’s marriage laws.
- Plaintiffs contend Alabama’s laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting same-sex marriage.
- Court adopts Searcy v. Strange’s reasoning, finding Alabama’s marriage laws unconstitutional and likely to violate plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marry.
- Judge Davis’s asserted qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity do not bar prospective injunctive relief; abstention or anti‑injunction arguments are rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do Alabama’s same-sex marriage bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment? | Plaintiffs: bans violate due process and equal protection. | Davis/Strange: laws serve interests or immunities apply; proceed cautiously. | Yes; laws unconstitutional; likely to prevail on merits. |
| Whether a class-wide preliminary injunction is appropriate against the new defendant and defendant class. | Class-wide injunction warranted to prevent ongoing unconstitutional enforcement. | Abstention/notice considerations apply; challenges to class certification procedural. | Granted; class-wide injunction warranted against enforcement of same-sex marriage prohibitions. |
| Whether Davis and other officials are shielded by immunity from injunctive relief. | Immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief for unconstitutional actions. | Immunity defenses could bar some relief. | Immunity does not bar declaratory or injunctive relief; relief ordered. |
| Whether to stay the preliminary injunction pending Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. | Stay would not be appropriate given constitutional ruling and ongoing harm. | Stay appropriate pending controlling Supreme Court decision. | Stay granted pending Obergefell decision. |
Key Cases Cited
- Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (preliminary injunction standards require four-factor test)
- McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 1998) (drastic remedy unique burden on movant)
- All Care Nursing Service, Inc. v. Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc., 887 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1989) (preliminary injunctions require clear showing of necessity)
- Searcy v. Strange, 81 F.Supp.3d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2015) (laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violate Due Process and Equal Protection)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (U.S. 1908) (prospective injunctive relief against state officers available for unconstitutional actions)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378 (U.S. 2015) (preemption and injunctive relief against state actors; modern Supreme Court guidance)