Strauss v. City of Lilburn
329 Ga. App. 361
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- On June 1, 2010, Strauss tripped and fell on a single-step riser on a City-owned sidewalk in front of the Blue Rooster Café and suffered serious shoulder injuries.
- The sidewalk upper and lower areas are the same light-colored concrete and are connected by one unmarked single-step riser flanked by brick columns; the step was described as "camouflaged."
- Strauss usually accessed the Café from an adjacent parking lot (no step there) and had not necessarily traversed this specific step before; on the day of the fall she approached the step from above and testified she knew a step existed but did not see this one.
- Strauss’s expert and the Café owner testified the step was not readily apparent from descent and is a known hazard when not delineated (no nosing, signage, or handrail).
- The City moved for summary judgment arguing Strauss had equal or actual knowledge of the hazard and the City had no notice of prior incidents; the trial court granted summary judgment for the City.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, finding material factual disputes about whether the step was a camouflaged hazard and whether Strauss had superior or equal knowledge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the City had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition | Strauss: the unmarked, same-color single-step was a camouflaged, well-known hazard the City knew about | City: although it knew the step existed, it had no notice the step was hazardous (no prior reports of falls) | The City had notice of the condition; whether it was a hazard is a jury question |
| Whether Strauss had equal or superior knowledge of the specific hazard | Strauss: she had not necessarily traversed this specific step and could not see the camouflaged rise despite paying attention | City: Strauss admitted there was a step in the area, so she had actual knowledge | Whether Strauss exercised ordinary care and knew of this specific, camouflaged hazard is a question of fact for the jury |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate | Strauss: evidence (expert and owner testimony) created a genuine issue of material fact about visibility and notice | City: undisputed facts show plaintiff knew of the step, so no liability | Summary judgment improper; factual disputes remain and case must go to trial |
| Whether the rule imputing prior successful negotiation applies | Strauss: prior successful traversal does not apply because she had not previously negotiated this specific camouflaged step | City: any knowledge of a step is imputable as knowledge of the hazard | Court: rule applies only where condition is readily discernible; here visibility is disputed, so imputation is inappropriate at summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- McLemore v. Genuine Parts Co., 313 Ga. App. 641 (appellate summary judgment standard review)
- Orff v. Stonewood Restaurant Group, LLC, 285 Ga. App. 488 (premises-liability superior-knowledge framework)
- American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442 (noting jury role in deciding foreseeability and proprietor duty)
- Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (allocation of burdens in premises liability)
- Cocklin v. JC Penney Corp., 296 Ga. App. 179 (duty to inspect and presumed notice for static conditions)
- Pinder v. H & H Food Services, LLC, 326 Ga. App. 493 (summary judgment improper where static condition was camouflaged)
- Perkins v. The Val D’Aosta Co., 305 Ga. App. 126 (imputation rule limited to readily discernible static conditions)