145 Conn. App. 414
Conn. App. Ct.2013Background
- Stratek sued Ibar for alleged fraudulent transfer of real property conveyed on September 19, 2006 to Christine Ibar.
- Conveyance was alleged to have been designed to hinder, delay, or defraud Stratek under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552a et seq.
- The present case was consolidated with Ibar v. Stratek Plastic Ltd., a breach of contract action regarding ownership of shares.
- A jury trial yielded a verdict for Stratek in the fraudulent transfer action; the breach of contract case had previously been resolved in Stratek’s favor via a directed verdict.
- In the fraud action, Ibar challenged the jury instruction on the standard of proof and the court’s remark regarding the directed verdict in the companion case.
- The trial court charged the jury that Stratek had to prove its case by clear, precise and unequivocal evidence and declined to recharge the jury on the standard of proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction on proof was correct | Stratek contends clear, precise, and unequivocal standard correctly stated the law. | Ibar asserts the stricter standard should have been emphasized and contrasted with preponderance of the evidence. | Correct standard given; no error; no mislead. |
| Whether informing the jury of the directed verdict in the companion case prejudiced Ibar | No prejudice from disclosure of the companion case outcome. | Informing about the directed verdict could bias the jury against Ibar. | Not prejudicial; instructions preserved jury independence. |
| Whether the court’s failure to object to the directed verdict remark or order to consider only certain evidence affected the result | Court’s guidance was proper and limited to the Stratek v. Ibar record. | Potential prejudice from directed verdict remark and limitation of evidence. | Not shown to have prejudiced Ibar; court followed proper procedures. |
Key Cases Cited
- Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383 (2008) (recognizes proper heightened standard of proof in certain civil contexts)
- Labbe v. Carusone, 115 Conn. App. 832 (2009) (validation of correct statement of law on standard of proof)
- Kosko v. Kohler, 176 Conn. 383 (1978) (plaintiff cannot complain about instructional error when charge substantially requested)
- Rua v. Kirby, 125 Conn. App. 514 (2010) (review of jury instructions must consider charge as a whole)
- Duncan v. Mill Management Co. of Greenwich, Inc., 308 Conn. 1 (2013) (jury instructions are evaluated for overall effect on verdict)
- Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn. App. 379 (1999) (deliberation length is not determinative of verdict strength)