951 F.3d 1347
Fed. Cir.2020Background
- Walter Strand served ~19.5 years in the Navy and was discharged under other-than-honorable conditions in 2009 after firing a gun at his estranged wife and her companion; he was convicted in state court of three felonies.
- Strand sought a six-month service-credit correction from the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) so he would reach 20 years and qualify for retirement; the BCNR recommended granting the correction in 2014.
- The Secretary of the Navy initially rejected the BCNR recommendation in 2015 (brief decision); the Court of Federal Claims (CFC) reversed as arbitrary and capricious; this court remanded in Strand II for further agency explanation because one of the Secretary’s stated reasons (alleged FAP/domestic-violence history) lacked record support.
- On remand the Secretary issued a detailed seven‑page 2018 memorandum denying correction, emphasizing the seriousness of Strand’s felony conduct, Navy core values, prior counseling entries, and likely harsher military punishment; the CFC again set aside the 2018 denial.
- The government appealed; the Federal Circuit reviews the Secretary’s rejection under the substantial‑evidence/arbitrary‑and‑capricious standard and reverses, reinstating the Secretary’s 2018 denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a service secretary may reject a BCNR recommendation supported by the record | Strand: Secretary may not overrule a substantiated board finding unless the board’s findings lack support in the record; otherwise §1552’s “acting through” requirement is hollow | Government: Secretary has final authority and may reject board recommendations so long as the rejection is supported by explicitly stated policy reasons or evidence in the record and is not arbitrary or capricious | Secretary may reject a BCNR recommendation—even one supported by the record—provided the rejection is not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law (affirming Secretary discretion) |
| Whether the Secretary’s 2018 denial was supported by substantial evidence | Strand: 2018 decision repeated earlier errors, inadequately considered positive service and post‑service rehabilitation, and relied on improper or unsupported factual reasoning | Government: Secretary’s detailed 2018 memorandum properly weighed the record and reasonably emphasized the seriousness of the felony conduct and other factors | The 2018 decision is supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious; reversal of the CFC is warranted |
| Whether the Secretary improperly relied on Navy "core values" (including retroactive application to 1992 counseling) | Strand: Core values post‑date some counseling entries; using them retroactively to justify denial is improper | Government: Core values are a permissible framework for assessing conduct in the 2018 decision; use was not arbitrary and does not require a particular analytical form | Use of core values as a framework was permissible; retroactive notice concerns do not make the decision arbitrary when other record support exists |
| Whether the Secretary relied on an unsupported finding of 1993 misconduct (necessitating remand) | Strand/Dissent: The record lacks evidence of separate 1993 misconduct; that unsupported finding was integral and remand is required | Government: Any error about the number/timing of early misconduct instances is harmless because the seriousness of the felony conviction alone supports denial | Majority: Any error about a 1993 misconduct finding is harmless here—the Secretary’s focus on the seriousness of the 2009 felony conduct and other grounds independently supports denial; dissent would remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. United States, 423 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Secretary has final authority to correct military records; courts apply substantial‑evidence review to Secretarial rejections)
- Boyd v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 1 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (Secretary’s discretion to reject board recommendations is reviewable for arbitrariness; courts may overturn only for caprice or lack of substantial evidence)
- Proper v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 317 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (criticized practice of secretaries deferring to military officers in overruling civilian board recommendations)
- Weiss v. United States, 408 F.2d 416 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (invalidated Secretary’s rejection where decision was effectively driven by a uniformed officer rather than civilian board findings)
- Sanders v. United States, 594 F.2d 804 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Secretaries may differ with board recommendations where evidence admits differing reasonable interpretations)
- Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (historical context for records correction boards relieving Congress of private bills; procedural context)
- Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (U.S. 1938) (definition of substantial evidence standard)