Stover v. State, 2017 Ark. 66

Daniel Stover was charged with multiple sex offenses against his minor stepson, including grooming, second-degree sexual assault, two counts of first-degree sexual assault, and rape; offenses occurred when victim was between 8 and 15.
Some charged acts occurred on or before Jan 1, 2015; two first-degree counts occurred between Jan 2 and June 8, 2015.
Stover had a prior conviction for first-degree sexual assault entered Sept 16, 2015 (plea June 8, 2015), which the State sought to use to enhance sentencing under Arkansas’s habitual-offender provisions.
At trial Stover objected on due-process grounds to applying enhanced ranges to conduct that predated the prior conviction; he did not assert an ex post facto claim below.
A jury convicted Stover on all counts; he received enhanced life sentences for the two first-degree counts, life without parole for rape, plus additional terms; sentences were ordered consecutive.
On appeal Stover argued the enhancement amounted to an unconstitutional ex post facto application; the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to reach the merits because the ex post facto theory was not preserved below and affirmed the convictions and sentences under Rule 4-3(i) review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether applying habitual-offender enhancement based on a later conviction to offenses that occurred earlier violated ex post facto prohibitions	Stover: enhanced punishment was applied ex post facto because conduct occurred before the prior conviction; he lacked notice that enhanced ranges could apply	State: argument not preserved as Stover only raised due-process claim below, not ex post facto; court may not consider new theory on appeal	Not addressed on merits — claim not preserved; appellate court declined to review ex post facto argument
Whether due-process objection to sentence enhancement was valid	Stover: enhancement violates notice and fairness under state and federal due-process clauses because prior conviction post-dated the charged conduct	State/Court: habitual-offender statute does not distinguish timing of underlying conduct; no procedural or substantive due-process violation found	Court rejected due-process-based objections at trial and imposed enhanced sentences; no reversible error found on Rule 4-3(i) review

Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001) (distinguishes due-process notice claims from the ex post facto clause and holds ex post facto applies to legislative, not judicial, action)
Kinsey v. State, 503 S.W.3d 772 (Ark. 2016) (appellate review limited to issues raised at trial)
Hampton v. State, 437 S.W.3d 689 (Ark. 2014) (preservation principle: appellant may not change grounds on appeal)
Gooch v. State, 463 S.W.3d 296 (Ark. 2015) (constitutional arguments must be raised and ruled on below to be preserved)