Stover v. Bruntz
218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2017Background
- Bruntz and Stover share two children; after separation they litigated child support for years. An April 2007 Santa Clara County support order set child support at $1,000/month and included a stipulated retroactivity provision regarding child-care costs.
- The April 2007 order stated the $1,000 included father’s half of child-care and that any modification could be retroactive to the date the child stopped receiving child care, per the parties’ stipulation.
- Stover often underpaid the $1,000 from 2007–2011; after Bruntz filed contempt proceedings in Feb 2011, Stover stopped payments and filed a motion to modify support and to determine child-care arrears in May 2011.
- Stover served requests for admissions; Bruntz failed to timely respond and the court deemed many admissions (including that no child-care occurred after Jan 2007) admitted in Nov 2013.
- After a combined trial on contempt and modification, the court (June 19, 2014) granted Stover child-care “credits” of $441/month for Jan 2007–May 2011, set reduced support without child-care add-ons for later periods, and imposed $1,250 in discovery sanctions against Bruntz. Bruntz appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Bruntz’s Argument | Stover’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court could award child-care credits retroactive to Jan 2007 (before Stover filed to modify on May 10, 2011) | Credits improperly retroactively modified the 2007 order and reduced arrears before a modification motion was filed | The April 2007 stipulation allowed retroactivity back to when child-care ceased | Reversed as to credits before May 10, 2011: retroactive modification limited by Fam. Code §§ 3603/3651/3653 to the date the modification motion was filed; credits before that date exceeded jurisdiction |
| Whether Bruntz is estopped from attacking the 2007 retroactivity provision because she failed to object/appeal earlier | Public policy re: child support allows collateral attack; not estopped | Retroactivity clause should be binding because not timely challenged (relying on spousal-support precedent) | Not estopped: courts will permit collateral attack where an order exceeds jurisdiction and contravenes public policy protecting children’s support |
| Whether the court properly deemed admissions and imposed discovery sanctions for failure to respond to requests for admissions | Deemed admissions should have been set aside (pro per unfamiliarity, mistake) | Admissions were properly deemed; sanctions mandatory for necessitating motion to compel | Affirmed: pro se status no excuse; statutory procedures for withdrawing admissions not followed; sanctions proper under Code Civ. Proc. §2033.280 |
| Whether court correctly set support without child-care add-ons for June 2011–Nov 2013 and whether Stover’s arrears barred his modification motion | Child-care add-ons should have been awarded; modification motion should be dismissed because Stover was in arrears | Deemed admissions showed no child-care costs in that period; arrears do not automatically bar a modification motion | Affirmed as to support for June 2011–Nov 2013: admitted lack of child-care costs justified no add-ons; arrears did not require dismissal of modification motion |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Cheriton, 92 Cal.App.4th 269 (explains retroactivity limited to filing date of modification motion)
- In re Marriage of Murray, 101 Cal.App.4th 581 (discusses estoppel from attacking retroactivity where not timely challenged)
- In re Marriage of Gruen, 191 Cal.App.4th 627 (court exceeds jurisdiction by retroactively modifying support earlier than statute allows)
- In re Marriage of Tavares, 151 Cal.App.4th 620 (disallows disguised retroactive modification via credits; statutory bar to setting aside accrued support)
- St. Mary v. Superior Court, 223 Cal.App.4th 762 (deemed admissions are conclusive and may not be contradicted by trial evidence)
- Wilcox v. Birtwhistle, 21 Cal.4th 973 (procedure for withdrawal of deemed admissions)
- In re Marriage of Jackson, 136 Cal.App.4th 980 (collateral attack permitted when act exceeds jurisdiction and violates public policy re: children)
- In re Marriage of Goodarzirad, 185 Cal.App.3d 1020 (voiding stipulated orders that divest court of jurisdiction over child matters due to public policy)