15-25-00020-CV
Tex. App.Aug 27, 2025Background
- SafeLease filed suit in Travis County on Dec. 30, 2024, and obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order on Dec. 31 without a hearing. Its original petition alleged antitrust and attempted-monopolization claims that fall within the Texas Business Court’s jurisdiction.
- SafeLease’s CEO had written allegations about Storable’s conduct weeks earlier, so Storable contends SafeLease knew the business-court jurisdictional facts before filing.
- After the district court denied a temporary injunction, SafeLease removed the case to the Texas Business Court; Storable argues that removal was untimely under Tex. Gov’t Code §25A.006(f)(1) and amounted to forum shopping.
- The Business Court denied SafeLease’s antitrust bases for injunctive relief and granted a temporary injunction based only on a tortious-interference theory requiring Storable to provide FMS (facility management software) access to SafeLease.
- Storable (appellants) argues the removal deadline was triggered by SafeLease’s pre-filing knowledge, that the Business Court should have remanded before granting the injunction, and that SafeLease failed to prove the injunction elements (irreparable harm, probable right to recover) and that affirmative defenses (justification, colorable right, unclean hands) bar relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (SafeLease) | Defendant's Argument (Storable) | Held / Lower-court action & Appellants' requested outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of removal to Business Court | Removal clock starts when plaintiff files its original petition; removal was timely. | Clock starts when party requesting removal discovered (or reasonably should have discovered) facts establishing business-court jurisdiction; SafeLease discovered those facts pre-filing so removal was untimely and barred. | Business Court denied remand and retained the case; Storable asks appellate court to reverse remand denial for untimely removal. |
| Jurisdiction to review remand denial on interlocutory appeal | Interlocutory appeal is limited to the injunction order; remand denial is not reviewable here. | Interlocutory appeal of a temporary-injunction order encompasses all issues affecting its validity (including remand); alternatively mandamus is available. | Appellants contend this Court has jurisdiction to review remand denial as part of the interlocutory appeal or via mandamus; lower court previously denied remand. |
| Irreparable harm / necessity for a temporary injunction | Access denial causes imminent, irreparable harm (loss of customers, reputational harm, risk of bankruptcy). | Alleged harms are compensable or quantifiable (money damages); SafeLease could obtain API access or otherwise mitigate; no evidence of imminent irreparable injury. | Business Court granted the injunction; Storable argues the injunction should be dissolved for lack of probable, imminent, irreparable harm. |
| Probable right to recover on tortious interference (and role of affirmative defenses) | SafeLease has a probable right to recover; justification defenses should not defeat temporary injunctive relief. | Affirmative defenses (justification based on property/contract rights, colorable good-faith claim, and unclean hands) must be considered and defeat any probable right to recover. | Business Court based the injunction on tortious-interference theory; Storable argues the claim is barred as a matter of law or by a colorable good-faith right and equity, so injunctive relief is improper. |
| Nature of the injunction (mandatory vs. prohibitory) | The order is permissible provisional relief to preserve the status quo and prevent harm. | The order is mandatory (it compels Storable to provide services); mandatory injunctions require clear, compelling evidence of extreme necessity, which SafeLease did not provide. | Business Court issued the (practically) mandatory injunction; Storable asks dissolution because mandatory relief standards were not met. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 424 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. 1968) (affirmative defenses must be considered when assessing probable right for injunctive relief)
- Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) (a colorable, good-faith claim to a legal right defeats tortious-interference liability even if later shown mistaken)
- Prudential Ins. Co. v. Fin. Review Servs., 29 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2000) (distinguishing when challenged conduct is "tortious in itself" and not protected by justification)
- In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 2018) (mandamus relief can issue for legal error even in unsettled areas of law)
- CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2011) (mandamus can be the efficient vehicle to correct interlocutory errors affecting ultimate relief)
- In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. 2008) (forum-shopping concerns justify equitable limits on procedural tactics such as judge-shopping)
- Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1974) (federal treatment of state-court injunctions after removal; context for arguments about post-removal effect of injunctions)