Stonecoat of Texas, LLC v. Procal Stone Design, LLC, 4:17-cv-00303

Stonecoat entities (Stonecoat, LLC; Stonecoat GP; Stonecoat LP) develop and sell spray-on stone facing; key employees/partners signed confidentiality and non‑compete agreements.
Two prior Texas state suits arose from related but distinct disputes: (1) the Hopkins suit (2015) involving an investment dispute with M. Hopkins/F. Hopkins and claims against Mergaux and Chamielec; (2) the Profanchik suit (2015) in Collin County in which Profanchik sued Morrison and Stonecoat and Stonecoat counterclaimed; the Profanchik case concluded with final judgment for Profanchik on Stonecoat’s counterclaims.
In May 2017 Stonecoat entities filed this federal suit alleging Lanham Act violations, federal DTSA trade‑secret claims, conversion, Texas theft, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, unfair competition, and related conspiracy claims against Procal, Profanchik, Kinser, Villarreal, Gonzales, Mergaux, and Chamielec.
Defendants moved to dismiss or stay under the Colorado River doctrine, or alternatively to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), or for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e).
The district court found the state proceedings not parallel to the federal action and concluded the Colorado River factors (five of six) weighed against abstention; it also rejected 12(b)(6) and 12(e) dismissal arguments, denying the motion in full.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Colorado River abstention — are the state cases parallel and do factors support abstention?	Stonecoat: suits are factually distinct and involve different parties/issues, so federal court should proceed.	Defendants: Hopkins and Profanchik suits are parallel and more advanced; abstention or stay is appropriate.	Court: Not parallel (different parties/issues); five of six Colorado River factors weigh against abstention; abstention denied.
Rule 12(b)(6) — failure to state a claim	Stonecoat: complaint pleads sufficient facts to make claims plausible under Twombly/Iqbal.	Defendants: complaint is conclusory and insufficient under federal pleading standards.	Court: Complaint meets Rule 8(a) and survives 12(b)(6); dismissal denied.
Res judicata / claim‑splitting — prior state judgments preclude claims here	Stonecoat: prior suits involve different operative facts and parties; res judicata does not bar federal claims.	Defendants: Hopkins/Profanchik judgments bar or preclude overlapping claims (improper claim splitting).	Court: Defendants raised a plausible res judicata defense but resolving it on a motion to dismiss is premature; better addressed later.
Rule 12(e) — motion for more definite statement	Stonecoat: complaint is sufficiently specific; discovery can clarify details.	Defendants: allegations are too vague to allow a proper response.	Court: Complaint is not so vague or ambiguous as to require a 12(e) order; motion denied.

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1976) (establishes narrow Colorado River abstention doctrine)
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (abstention contemplates that state litigation will fully resolve the dispute)
Brown v. Pacific Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2006) (lists Colorado River factors and parallel‑proceeding standard)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must be plausible to survive 12(b)(6))
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (two‑step Iqbal framework for plausibility review)
Murphy v. Uncle Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1999) (Colorado River factor analysis; progress of parallel actions)
Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2005) (res judicata transactional test)