Stone v. Board of Elections Commissioners, 955 F. Supp. 2d 886

Plaintiffs (would‑be Chicago mayoral, city clerk, and treasurer candidates and supporters) challenge Illinois statute 65 ILCS 20/21‑28(b) requiring 12,500 valid signatures to qualify for the Chicago municipal ballot.
Earlier preliminary‑injunction proceedings found the 12,500 signature requirement constitutional under existing precedent; Plaintiffs appealed but the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot.
In their third amended complaint Plaintiffs assert new and cumulative challenges: (1) the 12,500 threshold itself is unconstitutional; (2) a statutory or Board “one‑signature” limitation (10 ILCS 5/10‑3) preventing a voter from signing more than one petition for the same office; and (3) a 90‑day limit on circulating petition sheets (10 ILCS 5/10‑4).
Facts: one plaintiff (Walls) met the 12,500 threshold and appeared on the 2011 ballot; several others fell short (ranging from 250 to ~10,200 signatures). Multiple candidates nevertheless met the requirement for the 2011 and prior municipal elections.
The Board moved to dismiss the third amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6); the district court granted dismissal with prejudice, concluding Plaintiffs’ claims are foreclosed by Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of 12,500 signature requirement	12,500 is onerous and effectively bars unknown/outsider candidates	Requirement is a reasonable means to ensure serious candidates and prevent ballot overcrowding	Upheld — requirement constitutional under controlling precedent
90‑day petition circulation period	90‑day limit amplifies burden and, with signature threshold, severely restricts access	90 days is adequate given prior cases and practical collection estimates; not a severe burden	Upheld — not a severe burden; constitutionally justified
One‑signature limitation (voter may sign only one petition per office)	Board policy/statute limiting signings reduces available support and amplifies burden	Statute applies (65 ILCS 20/21‑28(c) incorporates Article 10; 10 ILCS 5/10‑3 limits one signature) and is rational to protect meaningful modicum of support	Upheld — limitation is statutory, applies, and is constitutional
Alleged misrepresentation by Board counsel to the Court	Plaintiffs claim counsel misled the court about the one‑signature rule, harming their injunction motion	Counsel was mistaken but not intentionally misleading; the law was available to both sides	Rejected — no intentional misrepresentation; claim fails

Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (provision for reasonable regulation of parties and elections)
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (States may limit ballot access to preserve order and prevent confusion)
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (election‑related rights are important but not absolute; reasonable restrictions permitted)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (balancing test for burdens on ballot access)
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (severity of burden determines level of scrutiny)
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (states may require a modicum of support to limit ballot length)
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (short circulation periods and signing limits can be constitutional)
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (state interest in avoiding confusion and frivolous candidacies)
Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. — upholding signature thresholds as reasonable)
Lee v. Keith, 463 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. — severe burden where multiple unusually restrictive rules combined)
Nader v. Keith, 385 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. — collection‑rate analysis showing practical feasibility of signature gathering)