Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802

Stokley was sentenced to death for the murder of two thirteen-year-old girls in Arizona (1991); sentencing focused on mitigating evidence related to mental health and brain injury.
Trial counsel presented expert testimony from a neurologist (Mayron) and a psychologist (Morris) linking impulsivity and diminished capacity to the crime; Barbour conducted a neuropsychological test and Hoffman evaluated pre-crime brain function.
Arizona sentencing court found three aggravating factors, minimal mitigating weight, and concluded Stokley’s capacity to appreciate wrongfulness was not significantly impaired; death sentence imposed.
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal, recognizing potential mitigation from head injuries but emphasizing Stokley’s above-average intelligence and lack of impulsive behavior.
Stokley pursued state post-conviction relief (PCR); PCR court denied ineffective-assistance claim for failure to argue mental incapacity; Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied relief.
Stokley filed a federal §2254 petition raising ineffective-assistance-at-sentencing, seeking an evidentiary hearing; district court denied relief after thorough review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Pinholster bar new-evidence review in federal habeas relief?	Stokley argues new evidence should be considered; his federal claim is unexhausted and merits a hearing.	Ryan contends Pinholster restricts review to the state record when the claim was adjudicated on the merits.	Pinholster applies; federal review limited to state-record unless new-claim exception applies.
If Pinholster applies, is there relief even with new evidence?	New declarations could support a colorable Strickland claim and entitlement to a hearing.	Pinholster precludes consideration of new evidence for merits review.	Even with Pinholster, no relief because the claim is not colorably alleging ineffective assistance.
If Pinholster does not apply, do the new declarations establish a colorable Strickland claim?	New neuropsychological evidence would show deficient representation at sentencing.	Counsel reasonably pursued mental-health mitigation; additional testing wasn't required or beneficial.	Under Strickland, counsel’s performance was reasonable; no colorable claim shown.
Are the claims procedurally defaulted or exhausted, and do cause/prejudice or diligence allow relief?	External factors and diligent development could excuse default.	Procedural default exists; cause and prejudice shown only in exceptional cases; diligence unclear.	Assuming default and cause/diligence, the claim remains noncolorable; no evidentiary hearing.

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2002) (framework for assessing exhausted vs. unexhausted after new evidence)
Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359 (9th Cir. 1999) (fundamentally altered claims standard)
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (exhaustion principles and standard for procedural default)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (U.S. 2011) (limits federal review to state-court record for claims adjudicated on the merits)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (highly deferential standard for Strickland review)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (procedural default and cause-and-prejudice exception)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2000) (cause and prejudice/diligence standards in §2254(e)(2))
Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (counsel's decisions judged against reasonable professional norms)