Stockman v. Credit Protection Association, LP., 1:16-cv-08059

Plaintiffs Alexandria Stockman and Elliott Gonzalez each received nearly identical collection letters from Credit Protection Association, LP (CPA) regarding unpaid debts to Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company.
Letters stated CPA could collect a state-allowed service fee and any applicable sales tax via draft or electronic transfer if a payment was returned unpaid, and warned the check maker could be subject to collection and possibly legal action.
Plaintiffs sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging the letters contained false, misleading, and threatening statements; both moved for summary judgment and CPA moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs admitted they owed the debt and did not dispute it; neither had made (or planned to make) payments by paper check (Gonzalez testified he hasn’t used checks in years; Stockman does not dispute the debt).
Court treated both cases together for efficiency and addressed standing, materiality of the returned-check language, truthfulness of sales-tax language, and whether the letter improperly threatened legal action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Plaintiffs say they suffered stress, concern, and deprivation of statutory rights from misleading/false statements.	CPA says plaintiffs have no concrete injury and thus lack Article III standing.	Court: Plaintiffs have sufficient statutory/injury evidence for standing under Spokeo and circuit precedent.
Materiality of returned-check reference	Plaintiffs claim reference to returned checks caused concern and is material.	CPA argues reference is immaterial because plaintiffs never intended to pay by check.	Held: Reference immaterial here; no evidence checks would be used, so any stress tied to returned checks is unreasonable.
Truthfulness of sales-tax statement	Plaintiffs contend reference to sales tax is misleading under Illinois law.	CPA notes letter references only an "applicable" sales tax and that CPA does not seek taxes where state law forbids it.	Held: Statement not false or misleading; generic "applicable sales tax" warning is reasonable and not deceptive.
Threat of legal action / unfair means	Plaintiffs argue language implying possible legal action threatened suit and was improper.	CPA contends mere mention of possible legal action is not a threat absent indications litigation is imminent or intended.	Held: Mere possibility language did not indicate imminent litigation or intent to sue; not an FDCPA violation.

Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694 (7th Cir.) (summary judgment standard and evidence viewed for nonmoving party)
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment requires no genuine issue of material fact)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party)
Premcor USA, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 400 F.3d 523 (7th Cir.) (cross-motions for summary judgment construed in favor of the nonmoving party)
Hahn v. Triumph Partnerships LLC, 557 F.3d 755 (7th Cir.) (materiality requirement in FDCPA § 1692e claims)
Ruth v. Triumph Partnerships, 577 F.3d 790 (7th Cir.) (burden to show a false statement would mislead the unsophisticated consumer)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (U.S. 2016) (concrete injury required for Article III standing)