Stine v. Montgomery Cnty.
185 A.3d 826
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2018Background
- Justin Stine, a volunteer EMT for Montgomery County, injured his foot on duty and missed ~2 months of work; he also worked part-time as an EMT for a private ambulance company and was a nursing student with ~2 years left.
- The Workers’ Compensation Commission calculated his average weekly wage as $64.65, the average of wages earned during the 14 weeks preceding the injury.
- Stine appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and requested a jury trial under LE § 9-745(d); he also retained a vocational expert to testify that his expected future wage (post-graduation/licensing) justified a higher average under LE § 9-602(a)(3).
- The County moved in limine to exclude the expert and moved to strike the jury; the circuit court excluded the expert, struck the jury, and remanded to the Commission, concluding COMAR required use of the 14-week average (or at least permitted the Commission to use it).
- On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed exclusion of the expert (holding § 9-602(g), governing volunteer EMTs, controlled and made (a)(3) increases irrelevant) but reversed the circuit court’s striking of the jury and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Stine's Argument | County's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of vocational expert testimony on expected future wage increases | Testimony is relevant under LE § 9-602(a)(3): expected wage increases from age/experience should be considered in average weekly wage | § 9-602(g) governs volunteer EMTs; (a)(3) is inapplicable so testimony about future wage increases is irrelevant | Court: Exclusion affirmed — § 9-602(g) applies and (a)(3) increases are not relevant to (g) computation (trial court did not err) |
| Right to jury trial / use of 14-week period to compute average weekly wage | Requested jury trial for de novo factual determination; argued Commission should consider a 52-week average or other evidence beyond the 14-week wage statement | COMAR 14.09.03.06 mandates using the 14-week period (or Commission permissibly declined to use 52-week average), so no jury question remains | Court: Striking jury was error — COMAR does not compel use of only 14 weeks; because Stine elected an essential trial de novo with a jury, the circuit court should have proceeded with jury trial; reversal and remand for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Richard Beavers Constr., Inc. v. Wagstaff, 236 Md. App. 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018) (COMAR does not restrict the Commission to a 14-week period if it deems a different period appropriate)
- Gross v. Sessinghause & Ostergaard, Inc., 331 Md. 37 (Md. 1993) (discussing agency discretion and wage-period calculations)
- Elms v. Renewal by Anderson, 439 Md. 381 (Md. 2014) (reviewing standards for appeals from administrative decisions)