Stiles Family Limited Partnership, III, LLP v. Riggs and Stiles, Inc. and Christopher Stiles
16-0220
| W. Va. | Nov 18, 2016Background
- Stiles Family LLP (landlord) leased 169-acre farm to Riggs and Stiles, Inc. and Christopher Stiles (tenant) under a 2006 farm lease limiting use to planting, maintaining, and cultivating farm crops; other uses required landlord written approval.
- In 2013 respondent Christopher Stiles allowed Walther Productions to file a seasonal use/variance application with the Jefferson County Zoning Board to explore holding a five-day, 15,000-person music festival on the farm.
- Petitioner learned of the application, objected in writing to the Zoning Board, and attempted to terminate the lease; respondents continued farming and the application was withdrawn in December 2013; the festival never occurred.
- In November 2014 petitioner sued for declaratory relief, alleging respondents breached the lease (and sought termination, injunction, constructive trust); respondents counterclaimed for attorneys’ fees and moved for summary judgment.
- The Jefferson County Circuit Court granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that an application (later withdrawn) did not constitute a prohibited nonagricultural use or an anticipatory breach; only respondents’ fee claim remained pending.
- The West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, finding the lease unambiguous, no unequivocal repudiation, continued agricultural use, and withdrawal of the application defeating an anticipatory breach theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether allowing/filing a zoning/variance application for a music festival breached the lease’s prohibition on nonagricultural use | Filing and permitting the promoter to apply was a prohibited use and breached the lease, allowing termination | An application is only a request; no actual nonagricultural use occurred and the lease was not breached | Filing (later withdrawn) did not constitute a prohibited use; no breach under the lease’s plain terms |
| Whether respondents committed an anticipatory breach by permitting the application | Permitting the application showed clear intent to repudiate lease restrictions—anticipatory breach does not require the event to occur | No unequivocal, absolute repudiation; respondents kept farming and the application was withdrawn, showing equivocation | No anticipatory breach: repudiation must be unequivocal and concern entire performance; respondents continued required performance |
| Whether the circuit court erred by reserving respondents’ claim for attorneys’ fees | Petitioner argued the reservation was improper on summary judgment | Respondents sought fees in counterclaim; circuit court left the claim unresolved | Court declined to decide fees on appeal; fee claim remains for circuit court to decide |
Key Cases Cited
- Kanawha Banking & Trust Co. v. Gilbert, 131 W. Va. 88, 46 S.E.2d 225 (1947) (clear written contracts are enforced according to plain terms)
- Mollohan v. Black Rock Contracting, Inc., 160 W. Va. 446, 235 S.E.2d 813 (1977) (anticipatory repudiation must be unequivocal, absolute, and positive)
- Annon v. Lucas, 155 W. Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343 (1971) (options for injured party upon anticipatory breach)
- Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden, 153 W. Va. 721, 172 S.E.2d 126 (1969) (clear and unambiguous contract terms must be applied)
- Berkeley County Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Vitro Corp. of Am., 152 W. Va. 252, 162 S.E.2d 189 (1968) (whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law)
- Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum, 179 W. Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986) (general rule that each litigant bears own attorney’s fees absent statute or contract)
