Stewart v. Stewart
230 Ariz. 480
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Thomas J. Stewart died February 14, 2010, leaving five adult children; Sean Stewart was disinherited.
- Three years before death, Thomas executed a will and amended a living trust; the will beneficiary is the trust and revokes prior instruments.
- Both the will and the trust contain in terrorem clauses punishing contesting or aiding in contesting testamentary instruments.
- Sean filed a formal testacy petition and later civil actions to invalidate the will and trust, with discovery disputes arising over the clauses.
- The superior court invalidated the in terrorem clauses as to the will and trust; Slade and Dan appealed seeking reversal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge in terrorem clauses | Sean had an injury from enforcement via discovery impediments. | Sean lacked a direct interest since he was not a beneficiary. | Sean had standing; proper to consider the motion. |
| Ripeness of enforcing in terrorem clauses | Contemporaneous controversy existed due to discovery threat. | No actual dispute would occur yet. | Controversy ripe; threat of enforcement sufficed. |
| Validity under A.R.S. § 14-2517 | Section 14-2517 forbids enforcement when probable cause exists, not language specifics. | Section 14-2517 neither bars in terrorem clauses nor requires particular wording. | Clauses enforceable unless probable cause to contest exists; court erred in facial invalidation. |
| Public policy of the in terrorem clauses | Clauses risk coercion and perjury by discouraging truthful contest and testimony. | Clauses are compatible with policy if limited to voluntary aid and not coercive testimony. | Clauses are not per se public-policy violative; interpretation should limit to voluntary aiding of contests. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estate of Shumway, 198 Ariz. 323, 9 P.3d 1062 (Ariz. 2000) (defines probable cause for in terrorem enforcement)
- Safeway Ins. Co. v. Collins, 192 Ariz. 262, 963 P.2d 1085 (Ariz. App. 1998) (ripeness and standing principles applied)
- Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 712 P.2d 914 (Ariz. 1985) (standing as restraint, not constitutional requirement)
- Cunningham v. Goettl A/C, Inc., 194 Ariz. 236, 980 P.2d 489 (Ariz. 1999) (Restatement guidance on permissible restraints)
- City of Tucson v. Pima County, 199 Ariz. 509, 19 P.3d 650 (Ariz. App. 2001) (standing development in non-constitutional context)