STEWART v. STATE, 372 P.3d 508

On August 16, 2014 Trooper observed Bruce Conway Stewart, Jr. make an improper turn, stopped him, and found drugs in the vehicle; Stewart admitted past methamphetamine use and said his license was suspended.
Troopers and a jail intake officer testified Stewart displayed signs consistent with methamphetamine intoxication (slurred speech, exaggerated movements, sweating, elevated pulse, distorted time perception) and he refused a blood test.
Stewart was tried by jury and convicted of Driving a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Drugs (Count 1, felony enhancement after prior felonies) and Driving With License Suspended (Count 4); acquitted on possession counts.
During the second (punishment) stage, the State introduced prior Judgment and Sentence documents to prove prior felonies; some exhibits contained attached Form 18.8(A) material and unredacted criminal-history pages not alleged in the Information.
Stewart appealed, raising (1) admission of prejudicial evidence at sentencing, (2) sufficiency of the evidence on the DUI-drugs conviction, (3) failure to instruct jury on definitions of "under the influence" and "impaired ability," and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court affirmed convictions but remanded for resentencing due to admission of prejudicial, unredacted sentencing/criminal-history materials; other claims were denied as discussed below.

Issue	Stewart's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Admission of prejudicial sentencing materials at second stage	Introduction of judgment-and-sentence exhibits containing Form 18.8(A) and unredacted criminal-history pages was improper and caused excessive sentence	Exhibits were proper proof of prior felonies; prosecutor did not make an unmistakable parole/probation comment	Plain error shown for inclusion of Form 18.8(A)/criminal-history attachments; remand for resentencing because error affected substantial rights at punishment stage
2. Sufficiency of evidence for DUI-drugs conviction	Evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Stewart was under the influence of drugs	Witness testimony and objective observations supported conviction	Evidence sufficient; conviction affirmed
3. Omission of jury definitions for "under the influence" and "impaired ability"	Failure to define these terms is reversible error	Error is subject to plain/harmless-error analysis; evidence of intoxication was overwhelming	Trial court erred in omitting definitions (plain error), but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; conviction stands
4. Ineffective assistance of counsel	Counsel was ineffective for failing to object to exhibits and failing to request definitions	No demonstrable prejudice under Strickland; some claims moot due to relief on Proposition 1	Claim denied as to trial-effectiveness; objection failures either moot (exhibit error remedied by remand) or not prejudicial

Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690 (1994) (plain-error review and harmless-error framework for waived instructional errors)
Harney v. State, 256 P.3d 1002 (2011) (analysis of when sentencing documents improperly invite juror speculation about probation/parole)
Primeaux v. State, 88 P.3d 893 (2004) (omitted-element jury instruction subject to harmless-error/Neder standard)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (an instruction omitting an element can be subject to harmless-error review)
Slusher v. State, 814 P.2d 504 (1991) (earlier rule that failure to define "under the influence" is per se reversible error—overruled to extent inconsistent with later harmless-error law)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard)
Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907 (2006) (plain-error review principles cited by concurrence)