Stewart v. State
310 Ga. App. 551
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Glenn Stewart was indicted on multiple counts of aggravated child molestation and child molestation under OCGA § 16-6-4.
- He was arrested December 16, 2004, released on bond March 2, 2005, and remained out of custody thereafter.
- A first indictment was returned February 2006; Stewart was arraigned May 16, 2006, with defense counsel on leave July–October 2006.
- The case appeared on trial calendars intermittently from 2007, with multiple continuances due to reindictments and defense or State scheduling issues.
- A second indictment was returned September 5, 2007 adding charges and a second victim; arraignment on the second indictment occurred October 24, 2007.
- A third and final indictment was returned April 14, 2010 after renewed prosecution and a 2010 meeting with the victim; arraignment April 21, 2010.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Presumptive prejudice from pretrial delay | Stewart argues delay exceeded presumptive prejudice threshold. | State acknowledges long delay but disputes weight and causes. | Delay crossed presumptive prejudice threshold; second-stage analysis required. |
| Barker-Doggett factors properly applied | Court erred by not adequately weighing all Barker-Doggett factors. | Trial court balanced factors; no abuse of discretion in denial. | Trial court did not abuse discretion overall; denial affirmed. |
| Responsibility for delay | State caused most delay via reindictments and scheduling failures. | Some delay due to defense counsel leaves and docket congestion. | Delay attributable largely to State, but not shown as deliberate or in bad faith. |
| Stewart's assertion of right to speedy trial | Motion to dismiss sufficed to assert speedy-trial rights despite no statutory demand. | Stewart waited over five years to assert; ineffectively asserted right. | Motion sufficed to assert right; but long delay and late assertion weighed against Stewart. |
| Prejudice showing | Presumed prejudice from delay supports dismissal; impairment shown by some evidence. | No oppressive incarceration; prejudice not shown to impair defense or cause anxiety. | Presumed prejudice acknowledged; however, no proof of actual impairment or significant anxiety; no dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52 (2008) (two-stage speedy-trial analysis; Barker-Doggett framework)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptive prejudice; long delays trigger second-stage balancing)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor Barker-Doggett balancing test)
- Davis v. State, 301 Ga. App. 155 (2009) (length of delay weighed as a factor; not dispositive)
- Porter v. State, 288 Ga. 524 (2011) (defendant's assertion and prejudice analysis in Barker-Doggett)
- Grizzard v. State, 301 Ga. App. 613 (2009) (state conduct and diligence in prosecution; delay context)
- Frazier v. State, 277 Ga. App. 881 (2006) (benign culpability when delay partly due to calendar backlog and attorney leaves)
- Nairon v. State, 215 Ga. App. 76 (1994) (older-case docket delay; delay attributable to docket and scheduling)
- Moses v. State, 301 Ga. App. 315 (2009) (actual impairment of defense by memory/Lomching of witnesses)
- Lambert v. State, 302 Ga. App. 573 (2010) (memory fade as prejudice; not alone sufficient)
- Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83 (2008) (preexisting Barker-Doggett prejudice considerations)