Stewart H. Hudson and Shelia D. Hudson v. The Winford D. Dixon Revocable Living Trust, Crystal J. Dixon, Trustee, Trevor Robbins, Amanda Robbins (mem. dec.)
47A01-1704-PL-865
| Ind. Ct. App. | Dec 13, 2017Background
- The Dixon Trust (and purchasers Trevor and Amanda Robbins) sought to quiet title to a 2.5-acre tract that lies entirely within the legal description of the Hudsons’ 108-acre parcel but has historically been treated as belonging to the Dixon family; the tract sits between a creek and the recorded boundary.
- The Dixon family and predecessors used and maintained the strip for decades: mowing, farming (hay), a softball yard, clotheslines, a satellite dish, a septic field extending under the strip, and a long-standing fence line along the creek that predecessors treated as the boundary.
- The Hudsons purchased their parcel in 2014 after a chain of title including foreclosure; a survey prompted the parties’ dispute when Hudsons sought to acquire the strip by exchange for an access easement, which the Robbinses refused.
- The trial court held a bench trial (and conducted an on-site inspection) and concluded the Dixon Trust established adverse possession of the disputed strip and denied the Hudsons an easement of necessity; the Hudsons appealed.
- On appeal the Hudsons challenged (1) procedural due process based on courthouse construction noise, (2) the adverse-possession ruling (focusing on notice and tax payment), and (3) denial of an easement of necessity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dixon Trust/Robbinses) | Defendant's Argument (Hudsons) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the trial continuation amid courthouse construction a due-process violation? | Proceeding did not impair Hudsons’ ability to present defenses; trial was meaningful. | Noise and transcript indiscernibles denied meaningful opportunity to be heard. | Waived for failure to object; record shows fair trial (transcription problems due to equipment, not noise); no reversal. |
| Did Dixon Trust prove adverse possession (notice element)? | Long, open, notorious use (decades of mowing, farming, fixtures, and continuous fence) provided constructive notice. | Use wasn't sufficiently visible/open to constitute notice by clear and convincing evidence. | Affirmed: evidence of longstanding fence and uses permitted finding of clear-and-convincing notice. |
| Did Dixon Trust comply with statutory tax-payment requirement for adverse possession? | Parties stipulated taxes were paid per tax paperwork; stipulation bars challenge. | Trial court erred by not making specific tax finding and plaintiffs failed to introduce tax documents. | Stipulation binding; better practice to find taxes, but no remand—no reversible error. |
| Are Hudsons entitled to an easement of necessity to access Back Property? | Hudsons lack practical access except across Dixon land; need implied easement. | Hudsons have alternative access routes across their own land (trails/road/Hubert Dixon Road); no necessity. | Affirmed denial: trial court found alternate access (a road/tractor route and blacktop access); no necessity. |
Key Cases Cited
- Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 824 (Ind. 2012) (procedural due process requires meaningful opportunity to be heard)
- Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (parties must have opportunity to present every available defense)
- Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind. 2005) (elements and definitions for adverse possession: control, intent, notice, duration)
- Cockrell v. Hawkins, 764 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (easement of necessity requires unity of title at severance and real inaccessibility; mere convenience insufficient)