Stevenson v. Commissioner of Correction
206 Conn. App. 275
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2021Background
- Petitioner Terrance Stevenson (born April 21, 1975) was convicted of murder as an accessory and conspiracy to commit murder for an offense committed March 21, 1994, when he was 18.
- Trial court sentenced Stevenson to a total effective term of 60 years incarceration without possibility of parole (April 18, 1997).
- Stevenson filed a habeas petition (May 24, 2018) arguing that, given emerging juvenile brain science and his age at the time of the offense, a 60‑year term without parole is cruel and unusual under the U.S. and Connecticut Constitutions.
- The habeas court dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim under Practice Book § 23‑29(2) without issuing the writ, appointing counsel, or giving Stevenson an opportunity to be heard.
- On appeal, the court held the dismissal procedure was improper under Gilchrist, concluded the petition was not amenable to gatekeeper declination under § 23‑24, and rejected the Commissioner’s attempt to invoke procedural‑default reasoning raised for the first time on appeal; judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was dismissal under Practice Book § 23‑29(2) appropriate without issuing the writ or following § 23‑24 gatekeeping? | Stevenson: dismissal was improper; court should have issued the writ, docketed the case, and appointed counsel. | Commissioner: dismissal was effectively a declination under § 23‑24 and case should be remanded with direction to decline to issue the writ. | Court: dismissal was improper under Gilchrist; petition was not amenable to declination under § 23‑24, so the writ should have issued and the case proceeded. |
| Does Stevenson state a constitutional claim (U.S. and CT) that 60 years without parole is cruel and unusual given he was 18 and juvenile‑brain science? | Stevenson: Miller‑style youth characteristics apply to those just over 18; Connecticut constitution may provide broader protection. | Commissioner: Federal Miller precedent does not extend to 18‑year‑olds; similar federal claims have been rejected. | Court: did not decide merits; noted federal claim likely meritless under existing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but Connecticut claim is novel and colorable, so merits must be heard. |
| Is Stevenson procedurally barred from raising his state‑constitutional sentence claim in habeas without first invoking a motion to correct sentence (Cobham)? | Stevenson: procedural default defense must be pled and litigated in the habeas court; it was not, so dismissal cannot be affirmed on that basis. | Commissioner: relying on Cobham, argues motion to correct or direct appeal is the proper vehicle and procedural default could justify dismissal. | Court: procedural‑default defense was raised for the first time on appeal; Practice Book requires the return to plead such defenses and the petitioner to be allowed to reply; cannot affirm dismissal on that unpleaded basis. |
| Should the habeas court have appointed counsel and taken other initial steps after filing? | Stevenson: yes — issuance of writ triggers appointment procedures and docketing under Gilchrist. | Commissioner: (implicit) procedural disposition could avoid appointment if petition is patently defective. | Court: because petition was not patently defective and petitioner remains incarcerated, the writ should have issued and the court should have acted on counsel/fee requests. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 548 (clarifying that a court must decline to issue the writ only when petition is patently defective under Practice Book § 23‑24; otherwise the writ must issue and § 23‑29 procedures apply)
- Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30 (procedural rule that sentence legality challenges are often addressed first by direct appeal or motion to correct sentence)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (recognizing that mandatory life without parole for offenders under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment; factual basis for petitioner’s argument)
- State v. Miller, 186 Conn. App. 654 (noting the question whether juvenile science justifies expanding state constitutional protections to older teens is unresolved)
- Haughey v. Commissioner of Correction, 173 Conn. App. 559 (illustrating that expanding Miller to those 18 or older has been rejected under federal Eighth Amendment jurisprudence)