851 F.3d 224
2d Cir.2017Background
- Stevens, a pharmacist of 34 years with diagnosed trypanophobia (needle phobia), refused to administer immunization injections after Rite Aid made immunizing customers an essential job duty in 2011.
- Stevens produced a physician’s note and testimony that exposure to needles causes syncope, hypotension, and anxiety; he requested an accommodation and declined immunization training.
- Rite Aid revised pharmacist job descriptions to require immunization certification and treated immunizations as an essential duty, terminating Stevens for refusal to perform injections.
- At trial a jury awarded Stevens substantial back pay, front pay, and non-pecuniary damages; the district court later dismissed his failure-to-accommodate claim and ordered remittitur which Stevens accepted.
- On appeal the Second Circuit reviewed Rule 50 JMOL de novo and concluded immunization injections were an essential function and no reasonable accommodation existed that would enable Stevens to perform injections.
- The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Rite Aid’s JMOL on wrongful termination and retaliation claims, affirmed dismissal of the failure-to-accommodate claim, and remanded for entry of judgment for Rite Aid.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether administering immunization injections was an "essential function" of the pharmacist job | Stevens argued immunizations were not an essential function because job description didn’t explicitly state injections required and pharmacists spent little time immunizing initially | Rite Aid argued it adopted a company-wide policy, revised job descriptions to list immunizations as essential, and consistently enforced the requirement | Held: Immunizations (injections) were an essential function; employer’s contemporaneous policy, job description changes, and enforcement are persuasive |
| Whether a reasonable accommodation existed that would enable Stevens to perform injections | Stevens proposed desensitization therapy, reassignment to technician, hiring a nurse to give injections, or dual-pharmacist scheduling | Rite Aid argued medical treatment is not a required accommodation, it offered non-immunizing roles, and employer need not eliminate essential functions or provide other employees to perform them | Held: No reasonable accommodation existed at time of termination; proposed measures were either medical treatment (not required), eliminations of an essential duty, or not shown available/acceptable |
| Whether Rite Aid failed to engage in the interactive process | Stevens argued employer did not meaningfully explore accommodations | Rite Aid argued no accommodation existed to enable performance, so any interactive-process failure is immaterial | Held: Even if interactive process was imperfect, recovery requires a plausible accommodation at dismissal; none existed, so failure to engage cannot support recovery |
| Whether termination was retaliatory under federal/state law | Stevens argued termination was retaliatory for asserting disability rights | Rite Aid argued legitimate, nonretaliatory reason: inability to perform essential job function | Held: Retaliation claim fails because inability to perform an essential function was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination |
Key Cases Cited
- Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2010) (standard of review for denial of JMOL)
- Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (standard of review for grant of JMOL)
- Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 1998) (JMOL standard: view evidence most favorably to nonmovant)
- Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006) (ADA requires employee be qualified with or without reasonable accommodation)
- McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (factors for determining whether a job function is essential)
- Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997) (no single factor dispositive on essential function analysis)
- Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasonable accommodation cannot eliminate an essential job function)
- Jackan v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2000) (employer–employee interactive process under ADA)
- McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012) (employee cannot recover for failure to engage in interactive process absent evidence a reasonable accommodation existed)