Stevens v. HMSHost Corporation
1:10-cv-03571
E.D.N.YAug 5, 2015Background
- Stevens worked as an Assistant Food & Beverage Manager I (ASM I) for HMSHost at multiple concessions in JFK Terminal 3 from 2008–2010, routinely working 50+ hours/week without overtime.
- His shifts were often 10 hours; he spent roughly 70–75% of time performing front-line tasks (making sandwiches, cashiering) and 25–30% on paperwork/oversight.
- Supervisors directed his movement between units and instructed him to perform non-managerial tasks; Stevens also sometimes assigned staff and issued disciplinary notices when directed.
- Job descriptions portrayed ASMs as managerial and tracked FLSA-exempt roles, but defendants acknowledged ASMs sometimes performed nonexempt work in practice.
- Plaintiff sued under the FLSA; the opt-in class was conditionally certified then later decertified; defendants moved for summary judgment asserting executive and administrative exemptions, which the court denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stevens is an exempt "executive" (primary duty management) | Stevens primarily performed nonexempt work (70–75%) and followed supervisors' directions; managerial tasks were limited or performed at supervisor direction | Stevens performed managerial duties (staffing, discipline, bank paperwork) and regularly directed 2+ employees, so management was his primary duty | Denied — genuine disputes of material fact about time spent on nonexempt work, importance of managerial duties, and independence preclude summary judgment |
| Whether Stevens customarily/directs 2+ employees | Admits he sometimes delegated but argues limited authority and supervision by higher-ups | Defendants show Stevens regularly directed staffing and implemented assignments | Court: No dispute that he regularly directed 2+ employees, but this alone cannot establish exemption without other factors |
| Whether Stevens had meaningful input into hiring/firing (executive prong) | He did not hire/fire or unilaterally recommend changes; disciplinary reports were written at supervisors' behest | Defendants claim his disciplinary input was given weight in status changes | Denied — factual dispute over his role in "change of status" decisions precludes resolution on summary judgment |
| Whether Stevens is exempt under the "administrative" test (primary duty office/non-manual work and discretion) | Tasks like paperwork and incident documentation were minor, ministerial, or not primary duties; lacked independent discretion | Defendants contend those tasks were directly related to management operations and involved discretion and independent judgment | Denied — material factual disputes about whether duties were primary and involved discretion/independent judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Pippins v. KPMG, LLP, 759 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014) (exemption inquiry mixes fact and law; primary-duty factual question)
- Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554 (2d Cir. 2012) (how employees spent time is a factual question in exemption analysis)
- Reiseck v. Universal Commc’ns of Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2010) (employer bears burden to prove FLSA exemption)
- Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2002) (FLSA exemptions narrowly construed against employers)
- Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 (U.S. 1960) (exemptions construed narrowly)
- Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 675 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1982) (assistant manager duties can support executive exemption if ‘‘boss in title and fact’')
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden principles)
- Clougher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 285 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (primary-duty inquiry typically requires developed trial record; disputes preclude summary judgment)