Stevens v. Commonwealth, 720 S.E.2d 80

Stevens was arrested for two murders during a Pittsylvania County drug-robbery; he was interrogated at a police station after being taken into custody.
Officer Chaney advised Stevens of Miranda rights and Stevens waived them, answering questions for about two hours with no request for an attorney.
The next day Stevens was brought for an initial appearance but was wrongly sent to the juvenile/domestic relations court instead of the general district court and placed in a holding cell.
Chaney spoke with Stevens in the holding cell and later told him he would be brought to the office to talk again; Stevens asked to see his child but remained in custody.
In the office, Stevens said, “That’s what I want, a lawyer, man,” and officers then questioned him further to clarify whether he wanted counsel for the interrogation or for court representation.
Stevens was convicted on multiple charges; the trial court denied the suppression motion; the Court of Appeals reversed and then affirmed en banc.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Stevens’ request for counsel was sufficiently unambiguous.	Stevens’ statement was clear and unambiguous.	The ambiguity in context allowed clarifying questions.	Ambiguity present; clarifying questions permissible.
Whether circumstances preceding the request allowed officers to ask clarifying questions.	Clarification was unnecessary given the clear request.	Context showed possible need to clarify to determine scope of counsel.	Circumstances allowed clarifying questions.
Whether post-request questioning violated Miranda.	Interrogation continued after a clear request for counsel.	Interrogation was lawful with clarifying questions.	No violation; clarification guided by reasonable-circumstances standard.

Hilliard v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 42, 613 S.E.2d 579 (Va. 2005) (established requirement to cease interrogation when right to counsel is invoked unless clarified)
Redmond v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 321, 568 S.E.2d 695 (Va. 2002) (legal standard for when words invoke right to counsel are ambiguous)
Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 677 S.E.2d 49 (Va. 2009) (pre-request circumstances relevant to clarity of request)
Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 262, 462 S.E.2d 112 (Va. 1995) (Edwards v. Arizona principle; ceasing interrogation when right invoked)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (ambiguity may be clarified; no automatic cessation requirement in all cases)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (U.S. 1984) (post-request responses cannot retroactively cast doubt on initial request; context matter)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (right to counsel must be honored; interrogation must cease)