460 P.3d 273
Ariz.2020Background:
- Langevin filed suit against Dr. Sholem on June 9, 2017; Rule 4(i) required service within 90 days (Sept. 7, 2017).
- Process server made six home-service attempts July 27–Aug. 11, 2017; evidence suggested someone removed a package from Sholem’s porch; Sholem later said he was out of town for roughly one week in early August.
- Langevin did not serve Sholem within 90 days; she moved in May 2018 (more than 10 months after the deadline) to extend time under Rule 4(i); the trial court granted an extension and she served Sholem July 17, 2018.
- Sholem moved to dismiss for abatement under Rule 4(i); trial court denied dismissal (without stating its basis); court of appeals declined jurisdiction; Arizona Supreme Court granted review.
- Central legal questions: whether Rule 4(i) requires a showing of good cause for any extension, whether Rule 6(b)(1)(B)’s excusable-neglect standard applies to post-deadline extension requests, and whether Langevin showed good cause or the trial court properly exercised discretion.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Rule 4(i) require good cause for any extension of the 90-day service period? | Langevin: Rule 4(i) allows courts to extend with or without good cause. | Sholem: Rule 4(i) requires a showing of good cause to extend. | Court: Rule 4(i) requires a mandatory extension if plaintiff shows good cause, but also permits discretionary extensions without good cause. |
| Does Rule 6(b)(1)(B)’s excusable-neglect standard apply to extension requests made after the 90-day period? | Langevin: Rule 4(i) governs and displaces Rule 6(b) for initial 90-day extensions. | Sholem: Rule 6(b)(1)(B) requires excusable neglect for post-deadline motions. | Court: Rule 4(i) controls initial extensions of the 90-day period; Rule 6(b)(1)(B) does not apply to those requests (but Rule 6(b) may apply to missed court-ordered deadlines). |
| What constitutes "good cause" under Rule 4(i)? | Langevin: Her service attempts and effort to identify/serve other defendants show diligence. | Sholem: Langevin did not exercise reasonable diligence; her reasons are insufficient. | Court: Good cause requires reasonable diligence and a valid explanation (usually an outside factor); Langevin’s reasons (busy counsel, pursuing other defendants) were insufficient. |
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying dismissal? | Langevin: Trial court acted within discretion to allow extension. | Sholem: No record basis supports discretionary relief; dismissal should have been granted. | Court: No abuse of discretion—record supported discretionary factors (no shown prejudice, possible evasion), so denial of dismissal is affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996) (Supreme Court: post-amendment federal rule allows courts discretion to enlarge service period even without good cause)
- Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rule 4(m) permits discretionary extensions absent good cause)
- United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006) (contrast: mandatory extension for good cause; otherwise court has choice to dismiss or allow more time)
- Maher v. Urman, 211 Ariz. 543 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (interpreting Arizona Rule 4(i) pre- and post-amendment history)
- Toy v. Katz, 192 Ariz. 73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (state appellate decision disapproved in part for suggesting 1996 amendment was non-substantive)
- Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756 (3d Cir. 1997) (prejudice for delay limited to impairment of defendant’s ability to defend)
- Murphey v. Valenzuela, 95 Ariz. 30 (Ariz. 1963) (historical statement of abatement rule purpose and prejudice concerns)
- Grobe v. McBryde, 105 Ariz. 577 (Ariz. 1970) (former rule: good-cause/ due-diligence requirement for extension)