Steven Romansky v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 933 F.3d 293

Background

In 1985 Romansky was charged in Pennsylvania with multiple vehicle-related offenses, including a conspiracy charge tied to a 1977 Pontiac; the charging papers evolved during proceedings.
At the 1987 trial he was convicted on most counts including a conspiracy count; jury instructions omitted an “and/or theft” alternative though the information had referenced it; verdict form simply listed "conspiracy."
Some convictions were later vacated (Superior Court, circa 1997) due to prosecutorial misconduct; Romansky was retried in 2000 on the vacated counts and reconvicted; the conspiracy conviction from 1987 remained undisturbed.
Romansky pursued multiple state post-conviction proceedings and then filed a federal habeas petition in 2009; the District Court denied relief and denied a COA; this Court granted a COA on two issues: (1) whether he was convicted/sentenced for a crime he was not charged with, and (2) whether 2000 counsel was ineffective for not raising that issue.
The panel also considered whether the 2000 resentencing reset AEDPA’s one-year limitations period under Magwood and whether to expand the COA to claims based on the Presentment, Brady, and the Grand Jury Clause.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AEDPA limitations were reset by 2000 retrial/resentencing for claims about the 1987 undisturbed conspiracy conviction	Romansky: 2000 resentencing created a new judgment under Magwood, so the habeas limitations period was reset and claims about 1987 are timely	Commonwealth: The 2000 proceeding did not create a new judgment as to the undisturbed 1987 counts, so AEDPA time was not reset	Held: No reset; petition untimely as to 1987 conviction because 2000 resentencing was not a new judgment for the undisturbed counts
Whether conviction/sentence was for a crime not charged (discrepancy between charging documents and jury instruction)	Romansky: He was convicted/sentenced for a conspiracy different from the charged conspiracy (due process violation)	Commonwealth: Claim is untimely for 1987 events; merits not reached because of timeliness	Held: Claim not properly before court (timeliness); dismissal affirmed
Whether 2000 counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 1987 conspiracy-charge discrepancy	Romansky: Asked counsel to raise the issue; counsel refused, constituting deficient performance and prejudice	Commonwealth: The conspiracy conviction was not at issue in the 2000 retrial; no basis to raise it then; also no constitutional right to counsel for collateral attacks	Held: Ineffective-assistance claim denied—no deficient performance or prejudice for trial/retrial counsel; Sixth Amendment does not guarantee counsel for post-conviction relief
Whether to expand Certificate of Appealability for Presentment/Grand Jury and Brady claims	Romansky: Presentment lacked specific charges; Grand Jury Clause/Stirone and Brady relief warranted; COA should be expanded	Commonwealth: Grand Jury Clause is not incorporated; Brady claim lacks merit under District Court analysis	Held: COA not expanded—Grand Jury-based claim foreclosed by Hurtado; Brady claim fails to show substantial showing of constitutional violation

Key Cases Cited

Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (distinguishes "second or successive" review and leaves open whether resentencing creates a new judgment for undisturbed convictions)
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (conviction on charge not made violates due process)
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (notice of specific charge is fundamental to due process)
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (indictment cannot be broadened at trial in federal grand-jury system)
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (Sup. Ct. 1884) (Grand Jury Clause not incorporated against the states)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2010) (discusses "sentencing package" and limited resentencing doctrine)