Steven R. Perry v. State of Indiana
13 N.E.3d 909
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- In Sept. 2012 Perry pleaded guilty to residential entry (Class D) and public intoxication (Class B); judgment and sentencing were deferred if he successfully completed drug court. He signed a drug court participation agreement.
- While in the program Perry was sanctioned three times for violations and was placed on electronic monitoring as a program condition.
- In June 2013 Perry committed new offenses; in Sept. 2013 he pleaded guilty to intimidation, admitted violating drug court, and agreed to termination from the program. The court entered convictions on the deferred charges and imposed concurrent sentences.
- Perry sought 127 days of credit time for the period he spent on electronic monitoring while in drug court; the trial court denied the request and denied a motion to correct error.
- Perry appealed, arguing electronic monitoring time as a drug court participant should count as credit time similar to community corrections or probation pre-sentence credit. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether time on electronic monitoring as a drug court participant must be credited toward sentence | Perry: program participation is functionally like community corrections or probation; time on monitoring should count as credit time | State: drug court participation (pre-conviction deferral) falls outside statutory credit-time schemes; trial court has discretion | The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying credit time for electronic monitoring while in drug court; such time is not an automatic statutory credit |
| Whether Indiana should adopt a single analysis for crediting monitoring time regardless of pre- or post-conviction status | Perry: uniform rule should apply—monitoring equals incarceration for credit purposes | State: existing statutory framework and precedent permit distinguishing pretrial/home-detention participants from sentenced prisoners | Court declined to change law; followed precedent permitting distinction and discretionary denials |
Key Cases Cited
- Molden v. State, 750 N.E.2d 448 (Ind. Ct. App.) (pre-sentence jail-time credit is statutory right; other sentencing matters are discretionary)
- Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.) (standard for abuse of discretion on sentencing matters)
- House v. State, 901 N.E.2d 598 (Ind. Ct. App.) (drug court participation analogous to probation for credit-time purposes — earlier panel decision)
- Meadows v. State, 2 N.E.3d 788 (Ind. Ct. App.) (time on electronic monitoring as voluntary drug court participant not automatically creditable; trial court has discretion)
- Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220 (Ind.) (trial court may deny credit for pretrial home detention; distinction between pretrial detention and post-sentence detention permissible)
- Lewis v. State, 898 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind. Ct. App.) (distinguishing pretrial and post-sentence home detention does not violate equal protection)
- Peterink v. State, 971 N.E.2d 735 (Ind. Ct. App.) (discussed ambiguity about ‘‘good time’’ vs. ‘‘credit for time served’’ on home detention)