Steven Painter Tonya Wright, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Earl A. Wright, III, Virginia Weaver, Individually and as Next Friend of A.A.C., a Minor And Tabitha R. Rosello, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Albert Carillo v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd.
561 S.W.3d 125
| Tex. | 2018Background
- Amerimex Drilling employed J.C. Burchett as a driller on a remote Sandridge drilling project; the Sandridge–Amerimex contract required Amerimex to pay the driller a $50/day bonus to drive the crew to the well site.
- Crews lived in bunkhouses located ~30 miles from the ranch; Burchett typically drove crew members between the bunkhouse and the site in his personal truck and received the driver bonus.
- After a shift Burchett was driving crew members back to the bunkhouse when he collided with another vehicle, killing two crew members and injuring others.
- Burchett received workers’ compensation for his injury; Amerimex contested whether other injured crew members’ claims were compensable but later sought summary judgment in the tort suit, arguing lack of control and that vicarious liability could not attach.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Amerimex; the court of appeals affirmed, applying a task-specific control analysis. The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding summary judgment was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Painter's Argument | Amerimex's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amerimex can be vicariously liable for Burchett’s negligence (employee status/control) | Burchett was Amerimex’s employee; Amerimex contracted/payments show it had the overall right to control and assigned driving duty to the driller | Amerimex conceded employment generally but argued it lacked task-specific control over Burchett’s driving, so no vicarious liability | Court: Employment relationship undisputed; right-to-control inquiry establishes employee status generally and is not re‑evaluated task-by-task; fact issue precluded summary judgment |
| Whether Burchett acted within the course and scope of employment when accident occurred (coming-and-going / special mission) | Driving crew to/from site was a specifically assigned duty (paid bonus) benefitting Amerimex and included returning crew so not barred by coming-and-going rule | The coming-and-going rule bars vicarious liability for travel to/from work; the contract refers only to driving out to site, not returning | Court: Coming-and-going rule applies generally but has exception for special or specifically assigned duties; evidence raised fact issue that Burchett was performing such a duty returning to bunkhouse; summary judgment improper |
| Whether summary judgment (no-evidence/traditional) was proper | Evidence (contract, bonuses, Burchett testimony, practice) produces more than scintilla on both elements of respondeat superior | Argued no evidence or conclusive evidence negating control/course-and-scope so judgment proper | Court: Viewing evidence favorably to nonmovant, factual disputes exist on course-and-scope and employee status for vicarious liability; summary judgment denied |
Key Cases Cited
- St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002) (explains respondeat superior and employer’s right to control as central to vicarious liability)
- Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754 (Tex. 2007) (sets course-and-scope test: acts must be of same general nature as authorized duties)
- Limestone Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. 2002) (factors for distinguishing employee vs. independent contractor; control inquiry described)
- Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., 653 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1981) (discusses coming-and-going rule and when travel allowance/remote work do not create special-mission exception)
- Eagle Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1981) (illustrates limits of applying employer’s general authority where worker also operates independent business)