Steven Olson v. Bemis Company, Incorporated
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14968
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Olson, a Bemis employee and Union member, was injured and terminated for safety violations.
- Union filed a grievance; Bemis offered $20,000 to settle in exchange for Olson’s waiver of all claims.
- Olson, via private counsel, countered; Union accepted on Olson’s behalf, but Olson did not consent.
- Settlement dated May 7, 2012; Bemis later paid $20,000, Olson did not cash immediately.
- Olson later sued Bemis and the Union in state court; defendants removed, asserting § 301 preemption; Olson I affirmed summary judgment for defendants.
- This suit challenges the settlement payment and alleges contract/estoppel claims; district court dismissed
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 301 preempt state-law claims here? | Olson argues state claims are preempted by § 301. | Bemis and Union contend complete preemption applies due to settlement contract under § 301. | Yes; state claims preempted under § 301 |
| Is a grievance settlement a § 301 contract? | Settlement may be non-contractual under § 301. | Settlement is a contract between employer and labor organization under § 301. | Settlement is a § 301 contract; preemption applies |
| Should Olson’s suit be treated as hybrid or straightforward § 301 action? | Exhaustion may be required; hybrid versus straightforward affects claims and timing. | Regardless, claims fail under federal common law. | Treatable as § 301 action; but claims fail on merits |
| Do Olson's remaining state-law claims state a plausible contract/estoppel claim? | Written contract breach supports relief. | Waiver/settlement terms foreclose recovery; estoppel claims fail under Wisconsin law. | None stated a cognizable claim; must be dismissed |
| Did the district court properly dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) given attached settlement and Olson I? | Dismissal premised on misreading facts. | Pleadings and settled terms show no obligation to pay; dismissal appropriate. | Correct to dismiss; no facially plausible claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (complete preemption under § 301 when state claim is intertwined with labor contract)
- DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (hybrid § 301 prerequisites; exhaustion via union representation)
- Lion Dry Goods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 369 U.S. 17 (1962) (settlements between employers and unions tied to labor peace fall under § 301)
- Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1991) (settlement and CBA context; GW of dispute resolution)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (when contract terms are not disputed, § 301 preemption may not apply)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (preemption depends on whether state claim requires interpretation of labor contract)
- Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (preemption and federal jurisdiction where state claim seeks to enforce a contract)