Steven Murray v. Jerry Howell, 21-15104

Background:

Petitioner Steven Murray sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court granted relief on ground one (involuntary jury waiver) and ground three (ineffective assistance of appellate counsel).
The State of Nevada appealed; the Ninth Circuit considered whether ineffective-assistance claims (ground two: trial counsel; ground three: appellate counsel) can provide cause to excuse the procedural default of ground one.
Ground one (involuntary jury waiver) was procedurally defaulted in state court. Murray asserted appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a substantive due-process challenge to the jury-waiver stipulation.
Murray did not fairly present that specific appellate-ineffectiveness theory in his initial state habeas; a later supplemental state petition was denied as untimely and successive, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed (finding no cause and prejudice).
The Nevada Supreme Court had disposed of the trial-ineffectiveness claim on the merits, triggering AEDPA deference; the Ninth Circuit concluded Murray failed to show cause and prejudice and that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland.
Conclusion: Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remanded.

Issues:

Issue	Murray's Argument	Nevada's Argument	Held
Whether appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness can excuse procedural default of involuntary jury-waiver claim	Appellate counsel failed to raise a substantive due-process challenge to the jury-waiver stipulation, so that failure is cause to excuse default	Murray never fairly presented that appellate-ineffectiveness theory to state courts; the appellate-ineffectiveness claim is itself defaulted	No — appellate-ineffectiveness claim is procedurally defaulted and cannot serve as cause
Whether Murray fairly presented/exhausted the appellate-ineffectiveness (substantive due process) claim in state court	He claims the claim was raised (or was preserved) in his first state habeas and later in a supplemental petition	The claim was not presented in the first state action; supplemental petition was untimely and successive and thus rejected	Not fairly presented; state courts did not address the merits; claim is defaulted
Whether ineffective assistance of trial counsel can excuse the default of ground one	Trial counsel’s failures (including acquiescing to an illegal stipulation) caused the default	Nevada: the trial-ineffectiveness claim was rejected on the merits by the Nevada Supreme Court	No — because the trial-ineffectiveness claim was adjudicated on the merits, AEDPA/Strickland deference applies and Murray didn’t show entitlement to relief
Whether the Nevada Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland to the trial-ineffectiveness claim	Murray argues the state decision unreasonably applied Strickland	Nevada argues it applied the correct standard and dismissed the claim on the merits	Murray failed to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland under AEDPA; relief not warranted

Key Cases Cited

Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446 (2000) (ineffective-assistance claim asserted as cause can itself be procedurally defaulted)
Moorman v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2005) (cannot later add unrelated instances of counsel ineffectiveness to an existing claim)
Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1992) (state court may treat failure to appeal as procedural default; multiple permutations of ineffectiveness claims not permitted)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (cause-and-prejudice standard required to excuse state procedural defaults)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA imposes a "doubly deferential" standard when reviewing ineffective-assistance claims)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (relief requires that the state-court decision unreasonably applied the general Strickland standard)