Steven Lowell Morton v. State
10-14-00113-CR
| Tex. App. | Aug 6, 2015Background
- On May 15, 2013 motel staff found Steven Morton asleep in room 107 around checkout time and discovered weapons in the room; staff called police.
- Officer Hall entered after 11:00 a.m., observed drug paraphernalia in plain view in an open bag on a table, reached in, found a scale and baggies, then arrested Morton and found a small baggie of methamphetamine on his person.
- Lab testing showed the recovered substance weighed 4.41 grams; Morton was indicted for possession of a controlled substance >4g and <200g with two felony enhancements alleging prior convictions.
- A jury convicted Morton, found the enhancement paragraphs true, and assessed punishment at 60 years’ imprisonment; Morton’s motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law.
- Morton appealed raising three issues: (1) trial court erred by not giving an Art. 38.23 jury instruction (unlawful search/seizure), (2) his sentence is disproportionate, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for saying he was court-appointed during voir dire.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court erred by omitting Article 38.23 jury instruction | Morton: testimony created a factual dispute whether motel staff entered room before checkout, so jury should decide admissibility of evidence | State: testimony showed motel staff did not enter before checkout; no disputed, material fact for jury under Madden | Court: No error —no genuine disputed material fact; Art. 38.23 instruction not required |
| Sentence is grossly disproportionate | Morton: 60-year sentence is excessive relative to offense | State: sentence falls within statutory range (enhanced) and Morton failed to object at trial; no showing of gross disproportionality | Court: Waived by failure to object; even if preserved, sentence within range and supported by criminal history; issue overruled |
| Ineffective assistance for counsel stating he was court-appointed | Morton: statement could bias jury or reflect counsel’s negative attitude, undermining Sixth Amendment right | State: isolated remark could be legitimate trial tactic; record silent on strategy; overwhelming evidence of guilt and lengthy record of convictions | Court: Not ineffective — record fails to show deficiency or prejudice; remark not so outrageous no competent lawyer would make |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (jury-charge error review framework)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Almanza harm analysis for charge error)
- Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (stepwise charge-error review)
- Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (requirements for Art. 38.23 jury instruction)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
- Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (application of Strickland in Texas)
- Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (prejudice/practical effect in Strickland analysis)
- Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (need to afford counsel opportunity to explain conduct)
- Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (limits of record on direct appeal for ineffective-assistance claims)