STEVEN KADONSKY VS. STEVE C. LEE (Division of Consumer Affairs)
A-3324-14T4
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | Oct 31, 2017Background
- Appellant Steven Kadonsky (incarcerated) petitioned the Acting Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs to reschedule marijuana from Schedule I to a lower schedule under New Jersey's Controlled Dangerous Substances Act (CDSA), arguing CUMMA established an "accepted medical use."
- The Acting Director denied the petition, reasoning N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) requires the Director to "similarly control" substances as listed under federal schedules unless he objects within a prescribed procedure and timeframe; the Director found no authority to reschedule marijuana independently of federal law.
- Amicus (L.B. on behalf of G.B.) described concrete harms from Schedule I classification: G.B., a registered medical marijuana patient with severe epilepsy, cannot receive doses from school nurses because marijuana is Schedule I, forcing half-day attendance and interfering with education.
- The majority found a tension between N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a) (Director may add/delete/reschedule substances considering scientific factors) and subsection (c) (mandatory conformity with federal scheduling), and held the Director erred in concluding he lacked authority to reclassify marijuana absent federal change.
- The court remanded to the Director to reconsider classification consistent with the opinion, without ordering reclassification; the decision emphasized administrative-review standards and left factual determinations (e.g., abuse potential) to the Director.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Director was required to reschedule marijuana off Schedule I because CUMMA recognizes medical use | Kadonsky: CUMMA's recognition of therapeutic use means marijuana no longer meets Schedule I criteria ("no accepted medical use"), so Director must reschedule | Director: N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(c) mandates conformity with federal schedules; Director lacked authority to reschedule absent federal change | Majority: Director erred to conclude he lacked authority to reclassify; remand for Director to consider rescheduling (not a mandate to reschedule) |
| Proper scope of Director's authority under N.J.S.A. 24:21-3(a) vs (c) | Kadonsky: (a)'s rescission/rescheduling power and Tate dicta allow Director to act based on scientific developments | Director: (c)'s "shall similarly control" and timing/objection process restrict departures from federal schedule | Majority: (a) grants authority to reschedule; (c) does not conclusively bar Director review; remand appropriate |
| Whether the 30-day objection window in (c) forecloses later Director action | Kadonsky: periodic updating and scientific developments permit later objection/reconsideration | Director/Dissent: Objection in (c) is time-limited to 30 days after federal action; Director may not revisit established federal schedules later | Majority: 30-day event will recur by operation of periodic updating; Director may reconsider in appropriate proceedings |
| Whether federal law/preemption prohibits state reclassification differing from federal schedule | Director/Dissent: CSA and Supremacy Clause preempt contradictory state scheduling; removing marijuana from Schedule I would conflict with federal scheme | Kadonsky: CUMMA demonstrates state intent to recognize medical uses without invalidating state scheduling authority | Majority: Did not decide preemption; remanded for Director to consider rescheduling — noted preemption/federal constraints are relevant but not resolved here |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64 (N.J. 1986) (observed Commissioner/Director authority to reschedule with regard to scientific developments; discussed medicinal-use tension)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2005) (upheld federal power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit intrastate medical marijuana; noted credible medical evidence could call federal scheduling into question)
- In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182 (N.J. 2011) (sets standard and limited scope for appellate review of administrative agency decisions)
