Steven Hill v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561

Hill and Roberts, African-American members of the Lewis v. City of Chicago class, completed a court-ordered hiring sequence but were not hired after failing/being delayed in medical clearances for CFD firefighter positions.
Lewis ordered the City to hire the first 111 class members who completed background, physical abilities, drug screen, and medical exams; Hill and Roberts were further down the randomized list and received conditional offers contingent on medical clearance.
Hill reported asthma and prior hernia/kidney stone issues; Roberts reported bronchitis. Both underwent medical testing, were asked for additional records/testing, experienced delays, and ultimately were not hired despite one being found medically qualified.
Plaintiffs filed EEOC charges, received right-to-sue letters, and sued under the ADA alleging discrimination based on actual/perceived disabilities and that the City’s medical procedures functioned as an obstacle preventing timely hiring.
The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly plead that they were not hired because of disability; the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether City violated §12112(a) by failing to hire them because of disability	Hill/Roberts: Medical screening requests (caused by disabilities) delayed clearance and thus caused loss of hiring opportunity	City: Medical screening and documentation were permissible post-offer procedures; nondispositive delays do not show hiring because of disability	Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs pleaded only that consequences of disabilities (delays) led to non-hire, not that disability was the reason for non-hire
Whether the City’s medical requests themselves violated ADA §12112(d)	Plaintiffs: Requests were unreasonable and denied disabled applicants adequate time to comply	City: Medical exams post-offer are allowed for all entering employees in same job category; statute does not require "reasonableness" of timing	Court: Dismissed — plaintiffs did not allege a §12112(d) violation or that requests were unlawful under statute
Whether plaintiffs stated a disparate-impact ADA claim from medical screening process	Plaintiffs: Medical screening burdened disabled applicants more, effectively excluding them	City: Process was facially neutral and applied to all entrants; no pleaded statistical disparity or showing process was impermissible under §12112(d)	Court: Dismissed — complaint lacked factual content showing statistical disparity or that screenings were impermissible under ADA

Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 734 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) and pleading plausibility)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility and conclusory allegations rule)
Arroyo v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 805 F.3d 278 (7th Cir. 2015) (elements and causation standard for ADA disparate treatment claims)
Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997) (consequence-of-disability vs. discharge-because-of-disability distinction)
O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2002) (post-offer medical exams permitted under §12112(d)(3))
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (disparate-impact theory overview)
Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014) (disparate-impact pleading requires factual showing of statistically significant disparity)