Steven Gregory Sloat, Ed Bryan, Church of Scientology International, David J. Lubow, and Monty Drake v. Monique Rathbun
513 S.W.3d 500
Tex. App.2015Background
- Rathbun sued several Scientology-affiliated defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy (intrusion on seclusion and public disclosure of private facts), and tortious interference with contract based on alleged long-running surveillance, harassment, and related acts from 2009–2013.
- Trial court entered a temporary restraining order forbidding electronic surveillance, following, threats, and certain contacts; defendants moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA).
- Defendants argued the claims were "based on, relate to, or are in response to" their exercise of free speech, association, and petition rights (claiming activities such as protests, filming, and pre-suit investigation were protected).
- The trial court denied the TCPA motions to dismiss and awarded Rathbun attorneys’ fees under TCPA § 27.009(b); defendants appealed interlocutorily under § 51.014(a)(12).
- The court of appeals reviewed the pleadings and evidence in the light most favorable to Rathbun and examined whether the factual bases of her claims constituted protected expression under the TCPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TCPA applies to Rathbun's claims | Rathbun argued her claims arise from nonprotected harassment, surveillance, and privacy invasions, not protected expression | Defendants argued Rathbun's suit is based on protected activities (protests/filming by "Squirrel Busters," and investigation/pre-litigation surveillance) | TCPA does not apply; defendants failed to prove by preponderance that claims are based on protected conduct |
| Whether defendants' protest/film activities constitute "free speech" or "association" protections | Rathbun said the core conduct (stalking, surveillance, sending sex toy, targeting family/co-workers) is not speech on a matter of public concern | Defendants contended protest/filming related to a matter of public concern (religious dispute) and thus is protected | Court held alleged harassment and privacy-invading acts are not fairly characterized as protected speech or association; Rathbun not a public figure |
| Whether pre-suit investigation/surveillance is protected "right to petition" activity | Rathbun maintained claims are based on tortious surveillance and harassment, not protected pre-litigation investigation | Defendants claimed surveillance was investigative/pre-petition activity incidental to potential litigation and therefore covered | Court did not need to decide scope of petition right because defendants failed to show Rathbun's claims were predicated on that protected conduct |
| Whether trial court properly awarded attorneys’ fees under TCPA § 27.009(b) | Rathbun argued defendants litigated to cause delay and award was warranted | Defendants pointed to trial court’s express statement that motions were not frivolous or solely intended to delay | Award reversed — court found no trial-court finding that motions were frivolous or filed solely to delay, so fee award under § 27.009(b) unauthorized |
Key Cases Cited
- Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015) (discusses TCPA standards and review approach)
- Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi, 449 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (pleadings and evidence viewed in favor of nonmovant on TCPA review)
- Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (TCPA review treats pleadings as evidence in favor of nonmovant)
- ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 464 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015) (communications tangentially related to public concerns may not be "matter of public concern")
- Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (pleadings and evidence standard referenced for evidence-based jurisdictional/screening review)
- Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) (attorney’s fees recoverable only when authorized by statute or contract)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (standard for determining limited-purpose public figure status)