804 F.3d 998
9th Cir.2015Background
- Steven Crittenden (African‑American) was convicted of two murders in 1989 and sentenced to death; he raised a Batson/Wheeler claim that the prosecutor struck the only African‑American venire member, Manzanita Casey, because of race.
- Casey expressed opposition to the death penalty but repeatedly said she could follow the law and might vote for death in some circumstances; the prosecutor challenged her for cause (denied) and later used a peremptory strike.
- The prosecutor had marked juror questionnaires with Xs (unfavorable) and Vs (favorable); Casey received XXXX (the only other XXXX was a white juror). The prosecutor testified years later that ratings largely reflected death‑penalty views.
- State courts denied the Batson/Wheeler claim; federal habeas proceedings produced the prosecutor’s rating notes and an evidentiary hearing. The district court initially denied relief, this court reversed in part (Crittenden I) and remanded in light of Cook v. LaMarque, then on remand the district court granted relief finding the strike was substantially motivated by race.
- The State appealed, arguing (inter alia) Teague nonretroactivity, failure to afford AEDPA deference, need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve credibility, and clear‑error challenge to the district court’s finding of racial motivation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Crittenden) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cook’s articulation that a strike violates Batson if "motivated in substantial part" by race is a new rule barred by Teague | Cook clarified Batson and therefore may be applied retroactively to Crittenden | Cook announced a new rule; Teague bars its retroactive application because conviction was final before Cook | Court: Cook did not announce a new rule for Teague purposes; it clarified Batson and could be applied retroactively |
| Whether the California Supreme Court’s denial of Batson/Wheeler is entitled to AEDPA deference | California decision applied the wrong ("strong likelihood") standard; thus no AEDPA deference | State: district court failed to apply AEDPA deference to state decisions | Court: California Supreme Court applied a contrary federal standard and was not owed AEDPA deference; trial court factual findings were rebutted by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether the district court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing or defer to the magistrate’s credibility findings | No additional hearing required because magistrate made no credibility finding about the prosecutor’s explanation (he offered none) and the district court reviewed the cold record | State: district court improperly rejected magistrate’s credibility determinations and should have held a hearing to observe witnesses | Court: No new hearing required; district court did not reject a credibility finding about the prosecutor’s reasons and properly reviewed the record |
| Whether the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of Casey was substantially motivated by race (Batson step three) | Comparative juror analysis, extreme XXXX rating disparity, meritless for‑cause challenge, and prior strike of a Black juror show race was a substantial motivating factor | Strike was based on legitimate race‑neutral reasons (death‑penalty hesitancy, indecisiveness, transportation concerns); findings are at most speculative and not clearly erroneous | Court: District court’s finding that race substantially motivated the strike was not clearly erroneous; Batson violation established and habeas relief affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prosecutor may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (limitations on retroactive application of new rules on federal habeas review)
- Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2010) (Batson step three: a strike violates Equal Protection if motivated in substantial part by race)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (clarified Batson step one: evidence sufficient to permit inference of discrimination)
- Miller‑El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (comparative juror analysis as tool to detect pretext at Batson step three)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (jury selection free of racial discrimination is a critical constitutional right)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (limits consideration of new evidence when reviewing state‑court decisions under § 2254(d))
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (presumption that state court adjudicated federal claim on the merits when disposition is unexplained)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (mixed‑motives and reasons analysis in Batson context)
- Williams v. Woodford, 396 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. rule: Batson violation is structural error)