Steven C. Albright and Rhonda Albright v. Rhea & Sons Enterprises, Inc. D/B/A Rhea Plumbing
03-15-00496-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 19, 2016Background
- In 2009 the Albrights contracted to buy a partially built spec home; they moved in December 2009.
- The Albrights sued the general contractor in May 2011 for construction defects (breach of contract, negligence, implied warranty, etc.).
- The general contractor moved to designate 18 subcontractors (including Rhea) as responsible third parties; the trial court granted leave after the parties settled in April 2013.
- The Albrights’ settlement with the general contractor produced a final take-nothing judgment as to that defendant; the Albrights expressly reserved the right to pursue the designated subcontractors.
- In 2015 the Albrights amended to add Rhea for alleged plumbing/propane defects; Rhea moved for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment asserting quasi‑estoppel/estoppel by contract, statute‑of‑limitations defenses, and that implied‑warranty claims against a subcontractor are barred by precedent.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Rhea without specifying grounds; the court of appeals affirmed in part (implied‑warranty) and reversed/remanded in part (negligence).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether settlement with the general contractor bars claims against a designated subcontractor under quasi‑estoppel / estoppel by contract | Albrights contend their post‑settlement suit against Rhea is permitted because the settlement released only the general contractor and they reserved rights to pursue designated third parties | Rhea contends settling the general contractor released all claims for the same defects and the Albrights cannot take a position inconsistent with that settlement | Court: estoppel doctrines do not bar the Albrights. Settlement language and Chapter 33 show the release applied only to the general contractor; designation as a responsible third party does not merge claims. |
| Whether statutes of limitations bar the Albrights’ claims against Rhea | Albrights concede limitations lapsed but assert joinder was timely under §33.004(e) after designation | Rhea argues claims are new and time‑barred | Court: §33.004(e) (in effect at the time) tolled/waived limitations for 60 days after designation; joinder was timely, so limitations defense fails. |
| Whether a homeowner can recover implied warranty damages from a subcontractor with whom the homeowner has no contract | Albrights attempt to distinguish precedent by referencing their settlement/reservation of rights (but no claim assignment) | Rhea relies on controlling appellate precedent barring implied‑warranty claims against subcontractors absent privity | Court: affirmed that implied‑warranty claim against Rhea fails as a matter of law; homeowner lacked privity with subcontractor. |
| Whether the no‑evidence motion on breach of contract is dispositive | Albrights say they did not assert breach of contract against Rhea | Rhea sought no‑evidence dismissal of any breach of contract theory | Court: no‑evidence ground is moot because Albrights disclaimed a contract claim against Rhea. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2000) (defines quasi‑estoppel)
- Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (contract interpretation principles)
- Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2009) (chapter 33 statutory construction/context)
- Raymond v. Rahme, 78 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (homeowner cannot recover implied warranty from subcontractor without privity)
- Codner v. Arellano, 40 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001) (same rule on implied warranty against subcontractor)
- Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003) (summary judgment burdens/standards)