Steven Arthur Hoskin v. State, 12-16-00161-CR

Steven Arthur Hoskin was convicted by a jury of burglary of a building (a barn) and sentenced to two years, with sentence suspended and community supervision recommended. The court later entered judgment reflecting the jury's verdict.
Police responded to a 9-1-1 call about two men loading items from property across the highway from Anita Lamb’s residence; Hoskin was found by officers with another man loading an old pickup.
Items taken included two 55-gallon barrels (formerly burn bins), a removed air conditioner, and a stainless steel soda cylinder from Mrs. Lamb’s husband’s work—items the men said they thought were "junk."
The barn was dilapidated, had stood for decades, and its door had fallen off 25–30 years earlier; the owner had not secured or used the barn in years and had not attempted to board or lock it.
The jury found Hoskin guilty, but on appeal he challenged legal sufficiency, arguing the structure was not an enclosed "building" under the burglary statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the structure was a "building" (enclosed structure) for burglary	State: barn qualified as a building supporting burglary conviction	Hoskin: barn was open, dilapidated, and unsecured for decades; not an "enclosed structure"	Reversed: barn was not an enclosed "building," conviction not supported by legally sufficient evidence

Ellett v. State, 607 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (an empty hotel with boarding and securing efforts can be a "building" for burglary)
Day v. State, 534 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (a structure with permanently open portals and no enclosure is not an "enclosed structure" under the burglary statute)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (legal-sufficiency standard: review evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (clarifies application of Jackson sufficiency standard in Texas)
Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (use of hypothetically correct jury charge to measure evidentiary sufficiency)