Steve Landy v. Pettigrew Crewing, Inc., 2:19-cv-07474

Plaintiff Steve Landy (a cameraman) sued Pettigrew Crewing in state court for failure to timely pay wages (Cal. Lab. Code § 204), inaccurate wage statements (§ 226), and PAGA penalties; claims cover the year before LWDA notice (July 9, 2018–July 8, 2019).
Defendant removed under federal-question jurisdiction (LMRA § 301), asserting a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the Union modified pay periods and thus preempts § 204 claims.
The CBA (retroactive to July 1, 2018) required weekly/biweekly pay and provided the employer’s payroll period could be up to 30 days (effective Oct. 1, 2018), longer than the maximum under § 204.
The court applied the Ninth Circuit two-step LMRA preemption framework (Curtis/Kobold): if a right exists solely because of the CBA, § 301 preemption applies.
The court held that § 204(c) allows a CBA to provide alternative pay arrangements (analogous to § 510(a) in Curtis), so § 204 claims arising during the CBA period (later § 204 claims) are preempted and removable; the court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over earlier § 204 claims and all § 226 claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 204 wage‑timing claims are preempted by LMRA § 301 for pay periods covered by the CBA	Landy: § 204 is a state right not created by CBA; CBA is an affirmative defense and cannot supply federal jurisdiction	Pettigrew: CBA expressly provides different pay arrangements; § 204(c) allows CBAs to replace default timing, so § 301 preempts	Held: Later § 204 claims (Oct. 1, 2018–July 8, 2019) are preempted; federal question jurisdiction proper
Whether § 204(c) should be treated differently from § 510(a) (Curtis) so that CBA does not displace the statute	Landy: § 204(c) does not expressly say other subsections “do not apply,” so default timing still governs	Pettigrew: § 204(c) operates like § 510(a); the statute permits CBAs to set alternative pay terms	Held: Court follows Curtis—§ 204(c) permits CBAs to supplant default timing; Curtis controls
Whether the court should keep the remaining state claims (earlier § 204 and § 226) after finding federal jurisdiction over later § 204 claims	Landy: If removal is only proper for later periods, remand the rest to state court	Pettigrew: The state claims arise from the same operative facts and should be retained under § 1367	Held: Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over earlier § 204 claims and all § 226 claims; no original federal jurisdiction exists over § 226 claims

Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (Ninth Circuit two‑step test; CBA can create alternative statutory rights and trigger § 301 preemption)
Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2016) (definition of rights that "exist solely as a result of the CBA")
Allis‑Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (state law claims that depend on CBA terms must be resolved under federal law)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well‑pleaded complaint rule for removal and artful pleading doctrine)
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (federal preemption can convert state claims into federal ones when completely preempted)
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (§ 301 preemption does not displace nonnegotiable state rights categorically)
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (supplemental jurisdiction over state claims sharing common nucleus of operative fact)
City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) (factors—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, comity—for exercising supplemental jurisdiction)