Steve Bishop v. Michael W. Goins, 809 S.E.2d 280

Steve and Jodi Bishop were subject to 12‑month stalking protective orders obtained by neighbors (the Goinses and the Powells) in 2014; the Bishops did not appeal those orders.
In 2015 the petitioners sought and obtained three‑year extensions of the protective orders after presenting evidence of violations during the 12‑month period; the Bishops appealed those extensions to the Court of Appeals.
This Court affirmed the three‑year extensions in a consolidated decision on September 8, 2016.
After affirmation, the petitioners sought costs and attorney fees under OCGA § 16‑5‑94(d)(3), expressly including fees incurred on appeal; the trial court awarded appellate fees to each petitioner.
The Bishops challenged (1) the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear motions filed before the remittiturs were filed, and (2) whether OCGA § 16‑5‑94(d)(3) authorizes recovery of appellate attorney fees.
The Court of Appeals (this opinion) affirmed the trial court, holding the court properly considered the motions after remittitur and that the statute authorizes appellate fee awards.

Issue	Bishop's Argument	Petitioners' Argument	Held
Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction because motions for fees were filed before the remittiturs were filed	Motions filed before remittitur were premature and thus null; trial court lacked jurisdiction to act	The trial court reacquired jurisdiction on filing of the remittitur and may adopt and decide motions filed earlier; motions were effectively presented	The court held the trial court properly considered the motions after the remittitur; no jurisdictional defect
Whether OCGA § 16‑5‑94(d)(3) permits awarding attorney fees incurred on appeal	Statute only authorizes fees in trial‑court proceedings; does not authorize post‑appeal appellate fees	Statute authorizes costs and attorney fees without limiting them to trial court; permitting appellate fees furthers the statute’s purpose to deter stalking and enable victims to defend protective orders on appeal	The court held the statute authorizes recovery of appellate attorney fees and affirmed the fee awards

Marsh v. Way, 255 Ga. 284 (appellate remittitur principle and when trial court is reinvested with jurisdiction)
Kautter v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16 (statutory language controls whether appellate fees are recoverable)
Evans County Bd. of Commrs. v. Claxton Enter., 255 Ga. App. 656 (appellate fees recoverable where statute’s language and purpose permit)
Springside Condo. Assn. Inc. v. Harpagon Co. LLC, 298 Ga. App. 39 (distinguishing statutes that permit vs. bar appellate fee awards)
Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan County, 265 Ga. App. 578 (example of statute expressly permitting appellate fees)
In re Estate of Zeigler, 295 Ga. App. 156 (awarding appellate fees where statute authorized expenses of litigation including appeals)
Kemp v. Kemp, 337 Ga. App. 627 (canons for strict construction of fee statutes and statutory interpretation principles)