Sternberg v. Lechman-Su, 350 P.3d 593

This is a legal malpractice action arising from defendant's representation in a dissolution of marriage; the dissolution judgment was entered July 17, 2009.
Plaintiff (pro se) filed suit on July 13, 2011, then amended on September 7, 2011; defendant moved to dismiss for causation and to compel more definite dates.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint added more specifications; defendant moved to dismiss under ORCP 54 B(1) and ORCP 21, and the court dismissed with leave to replead.
Plaintiff replead on January 30, 2012 (third amended complaint) and defendant again moved to dismiss with prejudice; plaintiff did not respond in writing but argued at hearing.
The trial court dismissed, ruling that all claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations; on appeal, the court reversed and remanded as to some specifications that state a claim and are timely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether any specifications of negligence were timely and stated a claim.	Sternberg argues some specs show harm occurred after judgment and timely; not all claims are barred.	Defendant contends most specs are time-barred and the entire action should be dismissed.	Some specifications stated a claim and could be timely; others were barred and should be dismissed.
Whether the trial court properly dismissed for failure to plead timely under ORCP 21 A(9) and sustain the statute of limitations.	Plaintiff contends accrual and discovery facts raise genuine issues of timeliness on a spec-by-spec basis.	Court correctly found claims barred by statute, especially where plaintiff knew facts earlier than two years before suit.	The court must assess accrual on a spec-by-spec basis; some specs are timely despite other time-barred claims.
Whether dismissal of undividedly pleaded claims as sanctions for noncompliance with court orders is appropriate absent findings on adequacy of pleading.	Dismissal should not bar adequately pleaded claims; sanctions were not tied to pleading merit.	Court’s dismissal could sanction noncompliance with orders; however, review of sanction as to merits is limited.	The appellate court did not decide sanctions on merits; remanded to consider timely, adequately pleaded specs.

Moser v. Mark, 223 Or App 52 (Or. App. 2008) (elements of professional negligence and causation)
Guirma v. O’Brien, 259 Or App 778 (Or. App. 2013) (accrual and timeliness in professional negligence)
Kaseberg v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP, 351 Or 270 (Or. 2011) (elements of legal malpractice; accrual timing)
Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247 (Or. 1994) (spec-by-spec timeliness consideration)
Doe v. Lake Oswego School District, 353 Or 321 (Or. 2012) (standard for accrual and discovery in tort)
Johnson v. Babcock, 206 Or App 217 (Or. App. 2006) (scope of ORCP 21 A(8) factual allegations; reasonable inferences)
U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or 663 (Or. 1976) (statute of limitations accrual principles)
Davies (U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies), — (—) (references for accrual timing in professional negligence)