Stepp v. Medina City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 71 N.E.3d 609

Background

Randolph Stepp was superintendent of Medina City Schools under successive contracts; in 2011 the Board approved an amendment promising reimbursement for "past academic degrees," and in 2012 the ESC paid $172,011 to cover Stepp’s student loans dating back to the 1980s–1990s.
In early 2013 the Board approved a new (2013) contract for Stepp including a bonus that was later revealed to be $83,017.06 and already paid; the Board also learned publicly of the ESC payment, prompting public outcry.
The Board issued a March 22, 2013 press release answering media questions about the reimbursements; James Shields (HR/director/legal counsel) made statements denying knowledge of the full reimbursement scope. Stepp alleged the press release and statements were defamatory and placed him in false light.
The Board placed Stepp on leave, sought audits, rescinded the 2013 contract for Open Meetings Act violations, sought recovery of the bonus, and later did not renew Stepp’s contract; Stepp resigned in April 2014.
Stepp sued in state court asserting breach of contract (regarding the 2011 amendment and 2013 contract), defamation, false light, and sought injunctive relief to correct minutes; the Board and Shields moved for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity and other defenses.
The trial court denied the Board Members’ and Shields’ summary judgment motions (and granted partial summary judgment rejecting the Open Meetings Act defense); appellants appealed and the appellate court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court lacked jurisdiction because Stepp resigned without exhausting R.C. 3319.16 remedies	Stepp contended his breach claims could proceed in court	Board argued R.C. 3319.16 provided exclusive administrative remedies and Stepp failed to exhaust them	Court: Board forfeited exhaustion defense by not raising it below; jurisdiction challenge overruled
Whether individual Board Members are entitled to R.C. 2744 immunity for defamation/false light	Stepp argued the press release and statements were malicious/bad faith such that immunity does not apply	Board argued they acted within scope and did not act with malice, bad faith, wanton or reckless conduct	Court: Denied summary judgment for Board; genuine issue of material fact exists on malice/bad faith/wanton/reckless standard
Whether Shields (counsel/HR) is entitled to R.C. 2744 immunity for his March 2013 statements	Stepp argued Shields drafted the amendment and his statements were false/reckless, raising factual disputes on malice	Shields presented testimony and affidavit showing he lacked knowledge of reimbursement scope and met initial summary judgment burden	Court: Shields met initial burden, but Stepp produced specific evidence creating a genuine issue of fact; summary judgment denied
Whether trial court erred by refusing to substitute state auditor’s final report for interim report	Board argued final report was admissible and dispositive on immunity/tort issues	Board sought substitution below but did not argue why final report was essential; trial court never ruled explicitly	Court: Argument not properly preserved (no trial-court argument showing why final report was integral); assignment overruled

Key Cases Cited

Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (summary judgment reviewed de novo)
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (moving party's initial burden in summary judgment)
Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356 (summary judgment standard; view facts favoring nonmoving party)
Jones v. Chagrin Falls, 77 Ohio St.3d 456 (failure to exhaust administrative remedies is affirmative defense that may be waived)
Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (definitions of wanton and reckless conduct under immunity statute)
O'Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374 (conscious disregard or perverse disregard standard for recklessness)