Stephenson v. Elison
405 P.3d 733
Utah Ct. App.2017Background
- Plaintiff Roger Stephenson alleges sexual assault by teacher Gerald Elison in 1981–82 and later cover-up by principal Bennett Neilsen and Alpine School District (ASD). He pursued administrative contact in 2008 and filed a notice of claim in November 2013 and suit in early 2014.
- In 2008 Stephenson reported the abuse to police, confronted Elison (allegedly obtained a signed admission and promise to avoid minors), and contacted ASD about lack of charges.
- Defendants moved to dismiss/for summary judgment arguing statutes of limitations and the Governmental Immunity Act’s one-year notice requirement had expired.
- The district court denied initial 12(b) dismissal but later granted summary judgment after concluding Stephenson failed to produce evidence creating a material fact issue on tolling and denied his request for more discovery.
- Stephenson later submitted an expert declaration (Dr. David Ranks) asserting repression/inability to comprehend the abuse until filing; the district court rejected it as not newly discovered and insufficient to raise a tolling issue.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal on jurisdictional grounds: Stephenson failed to timely give statutory notice and did not show equitable tolling or entitlement to more discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff complied with the Governmental Immunity Act one-year notice requirement | Stephenson contends his 2013 notice was timely because equitable tolling (fraudulent concealment/exceptional circumstances) delays the running of the notice period | Defendants argue the one-year notice ran (claims arose by 1985 or 2008) and no tolling applies | Held: Notice was untimely; plaintiff failed to show equitable tolling, so court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction |
| Whether an internal statutory discovery rule in the GIA precludes equitable tolling | Stephenson assumed equitable tolling applies to notice period | Defendants point to the 2004 internal discovery provision that governs when notice period begins | Held: Court need not decide conflict because equitable tolling fails on the facts; but notes internal discovery rule may limit equitable tolling for 2008 claims |
| Whether expert evidence (Dr. Ranks) created a genuine issue on tolling | Stephenson: Dr. Ranks shows repression/inability to comprehend abuse until 2014, supporting tolling | Defendants: Expert contradicts Stephenson’s own pleadings and admissions; insufficient to defeat summary judgment | Held: Expert contradicted judicial admissions and did not create a genuine issue of material fact; insufficient for tolling |
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying additional discovery before ruling on summary judgment | Stephenson: Needed expert discovery; summary judgment was premature | Defendants: Discovery would not change judicial-admissions-based outcome; motion was dilatory/lacking merit | Held: No abuse of discretion; additional discovery would not have altered outcome given plaintiff’s admissions |
Key Cases Cited
- Jensen v. Young, 245 P.3d 731 (Utah 2010) (summary judgment standard; construe facts for nonmovant)
- Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 284 P.3d 630 (Utah 2012) (review of summary judgment legal conclusions)
- Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 108 P.3d 741 (Utah 2005) (distinguishes statutory vs equitable discovery rules for tolling)
- Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007) (limits application of discovery rule; reluctance to apply absent total memory repression)
- McBroom v. Child, 392 P.3d 835 (Utah 2016) (plaintiff must initially show lack of knowledge to invoke equitable discovery/tolling)
- Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (failure to comply with GIA notice requirement deprives trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction)