Slip Opinion
S.D.N.Y.2020Background
- Plaintiff Benjamin Stephens sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging recurring assaults and retaliation by correctional officers at Green Haven (2010–2012); claims for a September 20, 2010 assault survived summary judgment.
- Stephens testified that after an August 14, 2010 assault (for which he filed a grievance), he was summoned on September 20, 2010 to meet Sgt. Cocuzza; during that meeting officers allegedly beat and threatened him and warned him not to file grievances.
- Stephens did not file an internal grievance about the September 20 incident, but did appeal the denial of his August 14 grievance on October 6, 2010 (he believed appeals were handled off-site and less risky).
- Defendants deny assaulting or threatening Stephens on September 20; factual disputes exist as to what occurred and whether threats made remedies unavailable.
- The Court held an evidentiary hearing on exhaustion and later ordered briefing on whether factual disputes about exhaustion are intertwined with the merits such that a jury (not the Court) should decide them.
- The Court concluded the exhaustion-availability question is intertwined with the merits (excessive force/retaliation); therefore the Court declined to dismiss the September 20 claims and left the factual issues to the jury at trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether administrative remedies were "available" for the Sept. 20 assault (i.e., whether intimidation/threats by officers made exhaustion impossible) | Stephens: threats and conduct by Cocuzza and others intimidated him and made the grievance process unavailable, excusing exhaustion | Defendants: remedies were available; exhaustion is a question for the Court pre-trial regardless of factual disputes | Court: factual dispute over availability intertwined with merits; leave to jury to resolve whether remedies were unavailable |
| Whether factual disputes about exhaustion must be resolved by the jury when they overlap with the merits | Stephens: intertwined facts implicate excessive force/retaliation and implicate Seventh Amendment jury rights | Defendants: Messa v. Goord means exhaustion is for the Court; any pre-trial findings won't bind a jury on the merits | Court: where exhaustion facts are intertwined with merits, Seventh Amendment requires jury resolution; Messa does not foreclose this exception |
Key Cases Cited
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (PLRA requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies; remedies unavailable in certain circumstances)
- Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284 (2d Cir. 2020) (threats, misrepresentation, or intimidation can render administrative remedies unavailable; objective "ordinary firmness" test)
- Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (availability of remedies judged by whether a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness would deem them accessible)
- Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2011) (exhaustion is generally decided by the court; jury trial not required when exhaustion facts are not intertwined with merits)
- Alliance for Environmental Renewal v. Pyramid Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2006) (when jurisdictional fact-finding would decide merits facts reserved for a jury, the court must leave the issue for trial)