Background

• Stephens indicted for first-degree murder and conspiracy; State intends to seek the death penalty and to introduce DNA evidence linking Stephens to the murder; SB 279 amended CrL § 2-202(a)(3) to require DNA or other linkage for death eligibility; Stephens moved for pre-trial evidentiary hearing on DNA linkage; circuit court denied; interlocutory appeal sought and stayed; Maryland Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and issued a per curiam order; the issue is whether the pre-trial denial is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
• The dispositive statute CrL § 2-202(a)(3) lists DNA evidence, a video confession, or a video link as prerequisites to death eligibility; the State notified intent to rely on DNA evidence at trial or sentencing.
• The circuit court’s ruling rested on the view that the sentencing authority must decide on DNA linkage, not the court pre-trial; petitioners sought a full evidentiary pre-trial hearing to determine lawfulness of death-penalty eligibility.
• This Court granted certiorari and ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding post-judgment review suffices for CrL § 2-202(a)(3) challenges; the collateral order doctrine does not permit immediate review here.
• The Court emphasizes that CrL § 2-202(a)(3) rights are not a right to avoid trial but a right to avoid a death sentence absent DNA or other qualifying evidence; we must defer to final-judgment review absent extraordinary circumstances.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Schuele v. Case Handyman, LLC, 412 Md. 555 (2010) (statutory interlocutory appeal framework; general lack of appellate route)
• Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660 (1983) (collateral order doctrine foundations; final judgment rule)
• Walker v. State, 392 Md. 1 (2006) (limits of collateral-order appeals)
• Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 259 (2000) (collateral order doctrine criteria)
• In re Foley, 373 Md. 627 (2003) (strict application of collateral-order requirements)
• In re Franklin P., 366 Md. 306 (2001) (four-part test for collateral orders)
• Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411 (1984) (distinction between double jeopardy and speedy-trial rights in collateral-order analysis)
• Bunting v. State, 312 Md. 472 (1988) (narrow scope of collateral-order doctrine; right to avoid trial usually not reviewable now)
• Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dept., 376 Md. 53 (2003) (immunity and other defenses generally do not qualify for collateral-order review)
• United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978) (structural analysis for collateral-order purposes; impact on pre-trial rulings)
• Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (collateral-order qualification for double-jeopardy-like claims)